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Michael Walzer has been criticized as an inconsistent theorist who defends moral 
universalism in Just and Unjust Wars and subsequently rejects it in favor of moral 
relativism in Spheres of Justice. In this thesis, I respond to this criticism, arguing that 
Walzer has a coherent idea of justice that is consistently displayed in the books. 
 
In this thesis, I will conduct a careful study of Just and Unjust Wars and 
Spheres of Justice to support my conclusion that, in both books, the state exists as a 
legal entity whose purpose is to protect both the community it constitutes and 
regulates and the rights of the individuals living in the community. In this 
interconnected relationship between state, community and individual, tensions arise in 
two ways. First, state authority generally implies a degree of coercion. Although 
coercion is sometimes permissible (say, to protect individuals from violence), it is 
conceptually in tension with the liberties of the individual. At the practical level, 
tensions also surface when the state does not adequately protect the community, or 
when the community does not recognize the authority of the state.  
 
In short, I argue that Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice are not as 
inconsistent as they seem, for they can be studied as a single discourse on two types 
of tension: 1) a conceptual tension between the authority of the state, the rights of the 
individual and the common life of the community; and 2) a practical tension in human 
relationship, where the world of politics is often characterized by situations of 
communal resistance to tyranny. It is these two tensions, found across Just and Unjust 
Wars and Spheres of Justice, which constitute a relationship between the two books. 
 
Critics tend to challenge the theoretical foundations of Just and Unjust Wars 
and Spheres of Justice from a practical standpoint, or raise practical issues that are 
beyond the books’ theoretical competencies. Understanding this distinction between 
theory and practice—and then exploring the tensions that arise in each domain—will 
help us resolve some of these criticisms. Although it is true that Walzer’s moral 
judgment in the practice of justice is not always satisfying, his writings reveal a 
scholar’s personal dedication to stand with the powerless, the oppressed and the poor 
in the world of politics, rather than with theorists in the realm of moral and political 
philosophy. This is a view seldom acknowledged by critics, and it is the view that I 
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Michael Walzer is renowned for two major works, Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres 
of Justice. In these books, one finds the compelling voice of an intellectual who 
passionately addresses the main political and philosophical debates of the late 
seventies and early eighties, criticizing America’s involvement in Vietnam in Just and 
Unjust Wars and challenging conventional ideas of social justice in Spheres of 
Justice. Thirty years on, the arguments of his books are still hotly contested. One 
particular criticism is the view that Walzer is an inconsistent theorist who defends 
moral universalism in Just and Unjust Wars and subsequently rejects it in favor of 
moral relativism in Spheres of Justice. In this thesis, I respond to this criticism, 
arguing that Walzer has a coherent idea of justice that is consistently displayed in the 
books. Before I state the core propositions of my argument, let me briefly present the 
fundamental premises in Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice that led to the 
view that Walzer is an inconsistent theorist.  
In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer is essentially developing a set of just war 
principles that has its intellectual roots in the classical texts of Maimonides, Aquinas, 
Vitoria and Suarez (JUJW xxii). One could say that his just war theory is a 
contemporary version of this intellectual tradition, written for American readers who 
are unfamiliar with moral philosophy yet keen to understand the morality of war. 
Indeed, at the time when Walzer was writing Just and Unjust Wars, Americans 
soldiers were involved in a war that was like the Athenians’ expedition to Sicily in the 
Peloponnesian War: a catastrophic military, political, and moral failure. Many were 
therefore questioning the morality of America’s involvement in Vietnam. And 
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perhaps many more were challenging the idea that a war could ever be moral, or 
fought morally.  
Just and Unjust Wars is Walzer’s response to the intellectual and political 
climate of his time. His discussion is founded on the legal authority of the state. This 
foundation is explained in the “legalist paradigm,” which is his way of expressing a 
set of international laws that guides the relations of states. A key aspect of the legalist 
paradigm is an analogy between the rights of a state and those of a citizen. For 
instance, a state’s aggression can be illuminated by analogy with an armed robbery or 
a murder. Unlike citizens, however, states do not have a global police to protect them 
from the wrongdoings of others. This significant difference grounds the legal 
authority of the state. Other states cannot challenge its territorial integrity and 
sovereignty. This does not mean that human rights are neglected in his just war 
theory. In fact, the doctrine of human rights is a “critical assumption” (JUJW xxii) in 
his book. Within specific moral conditions, states can intervene militarily for the sake 
of upholding human rights.  
In contrast to Just and Unjust Wars, Spheres of Justice focuses on the 
community, not the state. Although human rights are important in his arguments, 
Walzer says that “they are only of limited help in thinking about distributive justice” 
(SJ xv). This, to be noted, is his response to his contemporaries such as Robert Nozick 
and John Rawls (SJ xviii), whose theories are predicated on the importance of rights. 
In Spheres of Justice, the idea of community plays an important role in establishing 
the social meanings of goods, since that will determine the “natural conversions” (SJ 
19) of one good into another. Any unnatural conversion, say, of one’s wealth as a way 
to enter into an ecclesiastical office, or one’s political power as a way to gain access 
into better healthcare, is counter to the common knowledge of the community and 
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thus unjust. Every social good has its own sphere of distributive principles which 
should be protected against intrusion from other spheres. And from this it follows that 
equality in a community must be a “complex equality” that takes account of the 
meanings of different social goods within their proper spheres of distribution. This is 
Walzer’s perspective of social justice, one that grounds the study of equality within 
the particularistic mores of a community.   
 Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice have each been criticized for 
various reasons. For instance, Richard Wasserstrom, Charles Beitz, David Luban and 
Gerald Doppelt are dissatisfied with what appears to them as Walzer’s “statism” in 
Just and Unjust Wars. They argue that the rights of the state as established by the 
legalist paradigm are at odds with principles of human rights and overly tolerant of 
tyrannical governments.1 Ronald Dworkin, in his review of Spheres of Justice, finds it 
unacceptable that justice should proceed from the social meanings of a community. 
For this could reinforce a parochial account of justice that ultimately fails to do justice 
to what it (philosophically) means to be a free and equal person in society.2  
While I will consider some of these criticisms later in this thesis, it must be 
stressed that my focus in this thesis is a response to a different sort of criticism, the 
view that the doctrine of human rights in Just and Unjust Wars is fundamentally at 
odds with the communal basis of Spheres of Justice. This is a view that has been 
expressed by various scholars. Simon Caney, for instance, argues that Walzer has 
“two distinct, and incompatible, methodological commitments,” in Just and Unjust 
                                                
1 Gerald Doppelt, “Walzer’s Theory of Morality in International Relations,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 8:1 (Autumn 1978); David Luban, “Just War and Human Rights,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 9:2 (Winter 1980); Richard Wasserstrom, “Review of Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars: 
A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations,” Harvard Law Review 92:2 (December 1978); Charles 
R. Beitz, “Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics,” International Organization, 33:3 
(Summer 1979). 
2 Ronald Dworkin, “To Each His Own,” New York Review of Books, April 14, 1983, web version. 
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Wars to absolute standards of justice and in Spheres of Justice to cultural relativism.3 
Nancy Rosenblum, attempting to resolve the tension, concludes that he must be 
“avowedly relativist” and “radically particularist” even in Just and Unjust Wars, 
where just war conventions can give way to utilitarian considerations under 
conditions of extremity.4 Charles Jones, in contrast, thinks that Walzer is “ultimately 
universalist rather than relativist,” since he does appeal to a thin layer of universal 
moral values, in his judgment of illiberal societies. But like Wasserstrom, Beitz, 
Luban and Doppelt, Jones criticizes Walzer for “underemphasizing” the value of 
human rights in his overall political thought.5  
Clearly, from our brief survey of Walzer’s ideas and some representative 
criticisms, we observe a significant difference between Just and Unjust Wars and 
Spheres of Justice: the emphasis given to the authority of the state in Just and Unjust 
Wars contrasts sharply with the emphasis on the cultural rights of the community in 
Spheres of Justice. This difference leads to further questions. Why this difference? 
What is the relationship between the books? In the course of my research, I have 
found few who have given sustained attention to this question. If the criticisms by the 
scholars just mentioned are any indication, an attempt to relate the books would 
probably not put Walzer in a favorable light. At best, both defend the primacy of the 
state in international society but are silent about human sufferings; the rights of the 
individual are generally secondary, whether he is espousing on the importance of the 
community in Spheres of Justice or the authority of the state in Just and Unjust Wars. 
At worst, they simply contradict one another since Just and Unjust Wars is grounded 
                                                
3 Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 197. 
4 Nancy Rosenblum, “Moral Membership in a postliberal State,” World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4,  (July 
1984), 583. 
5 Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 202. 
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in moral universalism and Spheres of Justice in moral particularism. Although both 
these conclusions are reasonable, they only explain aspects of Walzer’s political 
thought. A deeper analysis is necessary before we can make a substantial conclusion 
on what Walzer really stands for in his idea of justice.  
In this thesis, I will conduct a careful study of Just and Unjust Wars and 
Spheres of Justice to support my conclusion that, in both books, the state exists as a 
legal entity whose purpose is to protect both the community it constitutes and 
regulates and the rights of the individuals living in the community. In this 
interconnected relationship between state, community and individual, tensions arise in 
two ways. First, state authority generally implies a degree of coercion. Although 
coercion is sometimes permissible (say, to protect individuals from violence), it is 
conceptually in tension with the liberties of the individual. At the practical level, 
tensions also surface when the state does not adequately protect the community, or 
when the community does not recognize the authority of the state.  
In short, I argue that Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice are not as 
inconsistent as they seem, for they can be studied as a single discourse on two types 
of tension: 1) a conceptual tension between the authority of the state, the rights of the 
individual and the common life of the community; and 2) a practical tension in human 
relationship, where the world of politics is often characterized by situations of 
communal resistance to tyranny. It is these two tensions, found across Just and Unjust 
Wars and Spheres of Justice, which constitute a relationship between the two books. 
In Chapter One, I will develop the first proposition by considering ideas 
common to both books: authority, rights and common life. These core ideas are 
consistently invoked in Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice and therefore 
also indicate the consistency of Walzer’s political thought. However, as I’ve briefly 
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mentioned, each idea is also in tension with the other. For instance, the common life 
is in principle an idea that necessarily impinges on the rights of the individual. To be 
certain, the common life is crucial to the development of Walzer’s distributive theory: 
whether a social good is distributed according to need, free exchange or desert would 
depend on a community’s interpretation of its common life. However, it is unlikely 
that everyone would agree on one specific interpretation; the distribution of social 
goods will therefore always neglect the interpretations of some particular persons. 
The tension between common life, rights and authority can be studied from another 
perspective as well, when we consider how the state, in distributing social goods such 
as healthcare and public education, can usually only do it efficiently if there is some 
form of taxation in place. The rights of the individual (particularly the rich) are 
therefore in tension with the authority of the state, when they are coerced to transfer 
part of their private wealth to public goods, even though they are unlikely to benefit 
significantly from public goods that are catered for the poor.  
 But theoretical harmony is not Walzer’s main interest, nor does he think it is 
possible in the practical world of politics. A moral principle may be coherent in 
theory but still lose its relevance in practice, because moral judgment is contingent on 
the circumstances and opinions of politicians and citizens, not just moral theorists. 
Staying in the realm of practice does not mean that Walzer is a moralist who panders 
to the madness of a society, for he maintains a clear moral vision. Understanding the 
methodological framework of Walzer’s moral judgment leads me to my second 
proposition, that the relationship between Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of 
Justice lies less in a conceptual tension between authority, common life and rights 
than in a parallel practical tension between the state, community and individual. 
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Walzer’s political thought must be understood in the light of how he always seeks to 
relieve human tensions in the world of politics.  
In Chapter Two, I will study selected texts in Spheres of Justice and Just and 
Unjust Wars to understand the methodological framework that Walzer employs to 
reconcile practical tensions. This framework is in essence “interpretative” in 
character, grounded in his understanding of authority, rights and common life as 
discussed in Chapter One. This framework is sufficiently resilient for him to resolve 
“everyday” tensions in Spheres of Justice and “radical” tensions in Just and Unjust 
Wars. An everyday tension that I will study in Spheres of Justice is that between 
politicians, capitalists and citizens in American society. Walzer’s detailed analysis of 
an association between politicians and capitalists in the United States, where 
politicians and capitalists enjoy significant influence that undermine the civil liberties 
of citizens, is at the same time his justification for the separation of money and 
politics. In Just and Unjust Wars, I will consider how radical tensions in international 
politics are resolved through Walzer’s revisionist perspective of the legalist paradigm. 
The legalist paradigm can be revised—that is to say, military intervention is 
permissible—when governments excessively disregard the self-determining capacities 
of individuals and communities. En route to my exposition on the revised legalist 
paradigm, I will also examine another essay, “Albert Camus’s Algerian War” in 
Walzer’s book The Company of Critics to understand his interpretation of the 
Algerian War from 1952 to 1964. There, Walzer’s appeal for a bi-national partition 
between the Algiers and the French pied noirs is curious, since he does not propose 
complete Algerian independence despite the many years of unjust French colonial 
rule. This clearly contradicts his premises concerning his revised perspective of the 
legalist paradigm. Understanding Walzer’s position regarding the Algerian War will 
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allow me to comment further on the strengths and weaknesses of his way of handling 
political tensions.  
By arguing, in Chapter One, that there is a conceptual relationship between 
Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice (the tension between authority, common 
life and rights), and, in Chapter Two, that there is a practical relationship between the 
books (the tension between state, community and individual), I hope to correct the 
view that the books are fundamentally unrelated. For there are two consistent threads 
of moral arguments operating throughout Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of 
Justice. Whereas conceptual tensions remain unresolved (and it is indeed difficult for 
most philosophers to resolve them), practical tensions are relieved through Walzer’s 
interpretative methodology. Still, one could argue that my way of relating the books 
has effectively skirted the issue of the inconsistency between the universalism of Just 
and Unjust Wars and the particularism (or relativism) of Spheres of Justice. I will 
address this charge of inconsistency in Chapter Three, where I will study Walzer’s 
later works, Interpretation and Social Criticism and Thick and Thin, to understand his 
inter-subjective perspective of moral universalism. Inter-subjectivity implies that 
human rights are universal to the extent that they are shared across different moral 
communities but not necessarily recognized by all, such as members of a cannibalistic 
community. It is this inter-subjective foundation that allows Walzer to consider the 
particularism of moral communities in Spheres of Justice. It is also this foundation 
that Walzer finds sufficiently robust for him to support the practical moral judgments 
he makes in Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice. 
Critics challenge the theoretical foundations of Just and Unjust Wars and 
Spheres of Justice from a practical standpoint, or raise practical issues that are beyond 
the books’ theoretical competencies. Understanding this distinction between theory 
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and practice—and then exploring the tensions that arise in each domain—will help us 
resolve some of these criticisms, like the claim by Wasserstrom, Beitz, Luban and 
Doppelt that Just and Unjust Wars is a “statist” book that is blind to human 
sufferings, or Dworkin’s view that the “communitarian” premise of Spheres of Justice 
creates an inaccurate and even biased system to distribute social goods. It is true that 
Walzer’s judgment in the practice of justice is not always satisfying. Still, his writings 
reveal a scholar’s personal dedication to stand with the powerless, the oppressed and 
the poor in the world of politics, rather than with theorists in the realm of moral and 
political philosophy. This is a view seldom acknowledged by critics, and it is the view 





Authority, Rights and Common Life 
 
Walzer’s idea of justice rests on an understanding of the state as the community in its 
constituted form. Although he never explicitly defines the state in this manner, we can 
infer from his writings that a constituted community (and not either a simple organic 
community or a world state) is the focus of his thinking about international ethics and 
distributive justice. In this chapter, Walzer’s concept of the state is also my basis for 
developing a conceptual relationship between Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of 
Justice. Specifically, I will study three foundational ideas on which his concept of the 
state rests, namely: the authority of the state, rights of the individual and common life 
of the community. Because authority, rights and common life are recurring ideas in 
Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice, they are also the crucial cornerstones of 
a conceptual relationship between the books.  
Before I can proceed with my discussion, it is necessary to comment on a 
difficulty in interpreting Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice. Walzer’s vivid 
style, which depends heavily on examples and on an appeal to shared experience, can 
sometimes obscure the theoretical claims he is making with respect to justice. I am 
not suggesting that Walzer is a bad writer. In fact, his style is persuasive, invigorating 
and even inspiring. As a public intellectual who writes with different audiences in 
mind—academics, students and politicians—he resorts often to metaphors, allegories 
and analogies to elucidate philosophical ideas that might be inaccessible to the lay 
reader. Walzer’s mastery of various literary devices is without question part of his 
widely recognized strength as a thoughtful and engaging writer. 
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But a story of justice is different from a theory of justice. A story of justice 
assumes that readers have a general understanding of what justice entails; however, 
the story itself may not bring them very far towards understanding the presuppositions 
of justice. Take for example, a term like “common morality” (JUJW xxii). Although 
common morality is “a critical assumption” (JUJW xxii) in Just and Unjust Wars, it is 
not immediately clear whether this common morality is grounded in reason or on 
values shared across different cultures. With a degree of inference, we can reasonably 
say that Walzer has the latter view in mind.6 Common morality, to be noted, is one 
out of many ideas in Walzer’s work that require readers to make their own 
conjectures. It is therefore difficult to systematically investigate what Walzer really 
means by “justice.” The task of understanding the coherence of his moral philosophy 
is perhaps comparable to that of a person trying to study an ecologically rich and 
diversified marine world from the edge of a boat, but whose effort to see what is 
going on is continually frustrated by the undulating waves of the surface waters.  
 
1.1 Concept of the State as a Constituted Community 
 
It is against this backdrop of a loosely structured idea of justice that I will now 
immerse myself into Walzer’s moral worldview to argue that his concept of the state 
is best understood as the community in its constituted form. My starting point is found 
in the idea of “political community.” That expression, which occurs often in Just and 
Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice, unfortunately, like the expression “common 
morality,” is indeterminate. For Walzer often equivocates between ideas of the state 
and the community in his characterization of the political community. In Just and 
                                                
6 I will discuss the philosophical foundation of Walzer’s common morality in detail in Chapter 3.  
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Unjust Wars, the political community is a legal entity that possesses territorial 
integrity and political sovereignty in international society (JUJW 53). In Spheres of 
Justice, it is described as a realm of shared morality and social meanings. The prefix 
“political” is actually redundant in the latter description since there is nothing 
specifically political about shared morality and social meanings. Still, there are 
instances in Spheres of Justice when Walzer reverts to a legal interpretation of the 
political community, especially on issues related to the rights of citizens to subsidized 
healthcare or basic education. In these instances, the prefix “political” is necessary to 
signify an understanding that the community is not just an organic community with 
members who share a common moral language but a state with institutions that can 
protect the rights of its citizens. 
In my view, Walzer’s political community is one in which the community is 
assumed to be the state, where members of the community are able to translate their 
conception of justice and goodness into a set of fundamental principles which the 
authorities of the state are obligated to uphold.7 In legal theory, we can say that the 
community has, in the process of translating its moral vision into a legal doctrine, 
constituted itself; in the act of constitution, members of a community become citizens 
of a state. I believe this theoretical congruence between state and community is what 
Walzer has in mind in Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice, whereby the state 
and community are identical except in situations in which they dramatically are not, 
such as in cases of secession or humanitarian intervention. The political community 
                                                
7 William Galston makes a similar argument that Walzer has two accounts of community: a “moral 
community in which… individuals are conjoined by their shared understandings of social goods” and a 
“legal community in which individuals come together through specific acts of consent and delimit 
sovereign authority.” But Galston does not explain how the two communities are related. See William 
Galston, “Community, Democracy, Philosophy: The Political Thought of Michael Walzer,” Political 
Theory, 17/1 (1989), 120 – 121.  
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can therefore be understood as the state, and the state can be accurately defined as the 
community in its constituted form.  
In Just and Unjust Wars, the concept of the state as a constituted community is 
most evident in Walzer’s discussion on the legalist paradigm. The legalist paradigm is 
a set of principles that guides the moral conduct of states in international society, of 
which the most fundamental principle is the proposition that states cannot attack other 
states for reasons other than self-defense. A crucial note here is the understanding that 
the legalist paradigm can only be conceptually meaningful if the state is assumed to 
be the community in its constituted form. By holding on to this assumption, states can 
be imagined as “citizens” of international society, whose rights to territorial integrity 
and political sovereignty in the international legal system are as inalienable as 
citizens’ rights to life and liberty in a domestic legal system. So, for instance, the use 
of force by one state against another is an act of aggression that is no different from 
that of an armed robbery or murder in a domestic society (JUJW 59). Unlike the 
domestic case, however, international society cannot enforce morality the way a 
government does, for there isn’t a global government to begin with. The lack of a 
global authority explains why it is permissible for a state, in a time of imminent 
duress, to take justice into its own hands and militarily repulse an aggressor.  
 A community that is not constituted is strictly speaking unprotected by the 
principles of the legalist paradigm. This might be harsh for it suggests an indifference 
to stateless communities or individuals. But this also means that some principles 
outside of the legalist paradigm must be applied. For instance, Walzer’s view on 
stateless individuals like the refugee is based on deontological principles of morality 
and not international laws (or the propositions of the legalist paradigm). To be certain, 
I am not referring to refugees such as those who were displaced by the Vietnam War. 
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Those were refugees whom Americans have a duty to help since the United States 
was directly responsible for the destruction of their political community (SJ 49). I 
mean refugees who have been the “victims of political or religious persecution” (SJ 
49) in their own countries. Although they have been forced out of their state, no state 
is obligated by law to accommodate them either. For until there is a global authority 
that could regulate the movement of refugees or punish countries that drove them out 
in the first place, the act of helping refugees is morally speaking an imperfect duty: 
“On the one hand, everyone must have a place to live, and a place where a reasonably 
secure life is possible. On the other hand, this is not a right that can be enforced 
against particular host states” (SJ 50). In such a context, Walzer argues that states 
ought to help refugees out of good will. The extent of a state’s help can in turn be 
subjected to prudential considerations such as its capacity and resources to 
accommodate scores of refugees. It does not seem to me that a stateless individual or 
a stateless community is any less important than a constituted community in Walzer’s 
eyes. Rather, the main issue in Just and Unjust Wars is about the rights of states to 
territorial integrity and political sovereignty in international society; it is difficult to 
talk about just war theory in relations to stateless communities that, in principle, do 
not possess either of the two rights.  
The state as the constituted community is also implied in Spheres of Justice, 
since it is the act of constitution that makes it possible for members to recognize a 
legitimate political authority that could distribute justice justly. Social justice, in 
Walzer’s view, can only be realized if there is a centralized authority that can 
distribute social goods in accordance with the mores of its community. Take for 
instance a simple social good like bread. Bread, in Walzer’s view, may be interpreted 
as the staff of life, the body of Christ, the symbol of the Sabbath or the means of 
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hospitality. During a famine, how the bread is fairly distributed will depend on how 
the authority accurately interprets the community’s mores (SJ 8). A community could 
of course distribute bread without the centralized institutions of the state. But that is 
only possible for a small and simple community where it is possible to reach a 
complete consensus on the best way to distribute bread. In a large and complex 
society like the United States, it is unlikely that members could, among themselves, 
distribute social goods like basic healthcare and education justly without centralized 
institutions having the authority to make just decisions. If the government is to let the 
community distribute healthcare through the market system, it is possible that the 
poor would not be able to enjoy affordable healthcare. This does not mean that the 
market system in itself is an unjust system, but it does mean that justice requires a 
political authority that can distribute social goods according to the principle of need 
and not free exchange.  
Hart’s conception of the modern legal system in The Concept of Law is useful 
to help us further understand the importance of a constituted community on matters of 
distributive justice. Hart’s distinction between a pre-legal community that organizes 
its way of life around a set of primary rules and a legal community that regulates its 
residents within a union of primary and secondary rules illuminates the parallel 
difference between a community whose members can only distribute simple goods 
like bread among themselves and a constituted community that has the centralized 
institutions of the state to distribute welfare, education, criminal justice, political 
power and so forth.8 Primary rules, according to Hart, are essentially a set of moral 
obligations that a member has towards others. In a pre-legal community, these rules 
are generally unwritten, tacitly agreed and widely regarded as important in sustaining 
                                                
8 See H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press), Chapter 5.  
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the customs of the community. Primary rules are however inadequate in a few ways. 
For instance, Hart says that there is an uncertainty about primary rules, since, without 
a written code, it is impossible to ascertain what the community’s mores specifically 
entail. The indeterminate character of primary rules also means that it is difficult to 
settle disputes as to whether a rule has or has not been violated.9 So, returning to our 
earlier example of bread, Hart would agree with Walzer that if there were two uses of 
bread, one as a religious offering and one as a means of sustenance, “it is by no means 
clear which use would be primary” during a famine “if the gods demanded that bread 
be baked and burned rather than eaten” (SJ 8). Because of the unsettling effects of 
primary rules, Hart says that they can only be customarily applied within a small 
community.  
A large and complex society such as the United States will require a set of 
secondary rules to remedy the deficiencies of primary rules. One of these rules is the 
“rule of recognition,” which is the requirement for a community to validate the 
character of the previously unwritten primary rules, usually in the form of a written 
constitution. In addition, secondary “rules of adjudication” are required to settle 
disputes concerning the interpretation and implementation of primary rules. Rules of 
adjudication will necessarily confer a set of judicial and political powers on a group 
of individuals—politicians, lawmakers and judges—to make proper judgments on 
matters of law and justice.10 Returning to our example of the famine-stricken 
community again, if the religious uses of bread were to clash with its nutritional uses, 
then what is needed is for people with authority to make a decision (grounded on the 
procedures established by secondary rules of adjudication) that best accommodates 
the moral, social and political circumstances of the famine. The introduction of 
                                                
9 Ibid., 93. 
10 Ibid., 94 – 98.  
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secondary rules to supplement primary rules is, to be noted, Hart’s way of introducing 
a modern legal system that presupposes elements such as “the law-making operations 
of the legislator, the adjudication of a court, the exercise of private or official powers, 
and other ‘acts-in-the-law’”11 necessary for the maintenance of law and order in a 
complex political community. Secondary rules are also, I argue, implicit in Walzer’s 
constituted community. Without such a legal structure, it is unlikely that members, by 
themselves, could distribute justice in a manner that is fair and sensitive to the mores 
of the community.  
So far, I have tried to explain why I think Walzer’s political community is best 
understood as the community in its constituted form. In Just and Unjust Wars, the 
state as the community in its constituted form is useful to help us understand the 
rights of the state in the international legal system in the same way political theorists 
discuss the rights of the citizen in a domestic legal system. In Spheres of Justice, the 
state as the community in its constituted form is useful to help us understand the 
importance of a legitimate political authority to distribute justice. I have also 
considered how a non-constituted community is unfruitful for Walzer to think about 
territorial integrity and political sovereignty in Just and Unjust Wars or distributive 
justice in Spheres of Justice. It is worthwhile to note that another alternative—that of 
a “global” constituted community—is also not a useful idea for Walzer to discuss 
international ethics and political theory. In “Governing the Globe,” Walzer says that it 
is unlikely that a centralized global authority could provide the right interpretation of 
social goods for every nation. Moreover, the distribution of resources from one nation 
to another is likely to be attenuated by racial, religious or ethnic divisions (AW 172). 
Also, although it would be unnecessary for future generations to read Just and Unjust 
                                                
11Ibid., 99. 
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Wars (for there would no longer be international wars but global crimes that are 
checked by a centralized police), it is unlikely that the global authority could resolve 
“the collective and inherited differences that make for rivalry and distrust today” (AW 
175). Hence, within the scope of Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice, a 
community that is constituted within a limited legal boundary is in Walzer’s view the 
best way to think about international ethics and political theory.   
Nevertheless, the concept of the state as a constituted community is 
susceptible to criticism. Luban, for instance, argues that Walzer’s account of the 
political community is in essence a “romance of the nation-state” that is at odds with 
human rights.12 Although Walzer does advance a series of revisions to the legalist 
paradigm to accommodate severe cases of human rights violations, Luban argues that 
the revised model is still limited in addressing the perennial problems of unjustified 
executions, torture and political imprisonments across different parts of the world.13 
Luban’s criticism is valid insofar as it single outs a pressing condition of political 
tyranny that has been under-explored by Walzer’s account of international ethics in 
Just and Unjust Wars. But this does not mean that Walzer hasn’t considered the 
problem of tyranny in his other writings. Now, however, is not the right time to 
discuss Walzer’s interlocution with Luban or critics who share similar views with 
Luban. Later, in Chapter Two, I will consider how Walzer’s approach to political 
reality is developed within an interpretative methodology that aims to resolve the kind 
of tyranny that Luban describes. Walzer is therefore not swept by a “romance of the 
nation-state” even if his writings appear to be so. 
For now, let us put aside reality and remain in the realm of political 
romanticism by assuming that the boundaries of state and community are indeed 
                                                
12 David Luban, “The Romance of the Nation-State,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 9:4 (Winter 1980). 
13 Ibid., 395 
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congruent. In this theoretical setting, how would the state as a constituted community 
look like? In my view, it would look something like this: a harmonious political 
relationship where the state exercises its authority wisely and justly to defend and 
uphold the rights of the individuals and the common life of the community. In 
Walzer’s political thought, authority, rights and common life are the core ideas that 
sustain the interrelationship between state, community and individual. They are also 
the ideas that sustain a conceptual relationship between Just and Unjust Wars and 
Spheres of Justice.  
 
1.2 Central Ideas in the State as a Constituted Community  
 
Before I explain how authority, rights and common life are consistently invoked in 
Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice, it is crucial to note that the ideas 
themselves are in a constant tension with one another. One way or another, the 
exclusivity of the common life is likely to neglect the rights of some individuals 
living within the community. Yet, the individual who insists on living the 
unencumbered life is in Walzer’s view deracinated and incapable of developing a 
purposeful life. Finally, the coerciveness of state authority, even when it used for 
ethical ends such as raising the welfare resources of a community, will necessarily 
impinge upon the rights of the wealthy, usually in the form of a progressive taxation. 
The tension between authority, common life and rights therefore makes it difficult for 
us to investigate the coherence of Walzer’s idea of justice. But this does not mean that 
one should collapse his political thought into one dominant idea either. For this could 
lead to a common but mistaken perspective that he is either a heavy-handed 
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communitarian scholar who advocates an exclusive common life or a rigid “statist” 
who is indifferent to the rights of individuals. 
 The best way to approach Walzer’s idea of justice is to therefore understand it 
as a system of ideas. The tension inherent in this system is analogous to the tension 
among the heavenly bodies of the solar system. Just as the gravitational pulls of the 
Sun, planets and moons collectively establish a stable solar system, so is the case in 
Walzer’s system of political ideas where the centralities of state authority, individual 
rights and common life exert a pull and counter-pull on one another that nonetheless 
establish a coherent idea of justice. Walzer’s concept of the state as the constituted 
community is based on this system of ideas. More importantly, I will argue that it is a 
system that is found in both Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice. For the rest 
of this chapter, I find it useful to discuss common life first, followed by rights and 
then authority. For it is through understanding the importance of the common life that 
we can understand how the other ideas are equally important in Walzer’s idea of 
justice.   
 
Common life of the Community  
 
Walzer’s positive exposition on the community is the most widely recognized aspect 
of his political thought—but possibly the most misunderstood as well. Scholars such 
as Chris Brown and Will Kymlicka have labeled him as a “communitarian” scholar 
even though Walzer has expressed skepticism with this political tradition in “The 
Communitarian Critique of Liberalism.”14 Part of the reason behind Walzer’s 
skepticism is the fact that communitarianism, as a concept in political theory, has 
                                                
14 See Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1992), 136 – 139; Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy 
(New York: Oxford University Press), Chapter 6.  
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many variants, some of which are not as progressive as his own account of social 
liberalism. Labeling Walzer as a “communitarian” may therefore misleadingly 
suggest that he is a political thinker who privileges the values of the dominant 
majority without sufficiently considering the moral views of minority groups. Still, 
there are elements in Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice that are 
communitarian in nature. These elements are found in what Walzer calls the 
“common life” of community.   
In the common life, citizens learn to understand the character of their 
community and the moral obligations they have towards one another or to non-
members. But it is difficult to describe the common life in concrete terms. Walzer 
himself says that “few… have any direct experience of what a country is or of what it 
means to be a member. We often have strong feelings about our country, but we have 
only dim perceptions of it.” The common life “is, after all, invisible; we actually see 
only its symbols, offices, and representatives” (SJ 35). In my view, the common life is 
best understood as exhibiting two forms: 1) an intangible set of moral and social 
values (such as the values of civic republicanism in American society) that promotes a 
spirit of cooperation among members; and 2) a more visible set of political principles 
(such as the Constitution of the United States) which ensures the peaceful co-
existence of citizens. I will discuss the former in this section and the latter in the next.  
 In Just and Unjust Wars, the common life is also Walzer’s way of providing a 
richer account of the social contract theory, a theory that he finds abstract in 
describing or explaining political life. Although his analysis of the social contract is at 
best cursory in Just and Unjust Wars, he advises readers to refer to his more detailed 
exposition in Obligations (JUJW 54). There, Walzer argues that Rousseau’s contract 
theory is better than Hobbes’s, for it presupposes a vibrant and ethical common life 
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that is crucial for the moral development of the Rousseauian citizen. It is this common 
life, Walzer argues, that motivates the Rousseauian citizen to fight and even die for 
the state. Hobbes’s theory, on the other hand, is a negative account of the human 
spirit, where there can be no obligation for citizens to fight or to die in what is after all 
a transactional relationship between state and society. One could imagine a scenario 
where soldiers are bound by their profession to fight for what is sadly an empty and 
abandoned state.15 In fact, in such a scenario, there isn’t a state to speak of; the 
Hobbesian social contract, at the first siren of war, was already void. 
Not that Hobbes is significantly troubled by the dissolution of the 
Commonwealth. His familiar contract theory in Leviathan is centered on the idea that 
the sovereign is authorized to maintain law and order in what would otherwise be a 
state of nature: bellum omnium contra omnes, a war of all against all where 
individuals compete with one another for survival.16 The sovereign’s authority is in 
turn derived from the rights of the individual; in exchange for the freedom from fear, 
the individual gives up some of his natural rights to the sovereign, thereby allowing 
the sovereign to make decisions on behalf of the Commonwealth. But this also means 
that obedience necessarily ceases when the sovereign is unable to protect its subjects. 
For if it is the freedom from fear that motivates the natural man to give up some of his 
rights to the sovereign, then it is irrational for him to confront his fears again in a 
risky war. In the fork that leads to either the tyranny of war or the tyranny of nature, 
the Hobbesian man must at least retain his right to choose. Death may consume him 
                                                
15 Hobbes makes a qualification that a distinction must be made between the responsibilities of the 
citizen and those of the soldier. Whereas a citizen is morally obliged to protect the Commonwealth (but 
cannot be punished for failure to do so), a soldier is bound by his profession to fight against the enemy; 
it is his professional duty to fight and even die for the state. Legally speaking, the soldier is bound by 
his professional contract with the state (not the social contract) to fight a war well. Thomas Hobbes, 
Leviathan (London: Everyman’s Library, 1973), Chapter 21, 115.   
16 Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen, ed. Bernard Gert (Atlantic Highland: Humanities Press; Brighton: 
Harvester, 1978, 1972), 101.   
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in either realm. But it is his natural right to wager with his life. The issue therefore is 
more about honor than justice: the Hobbesian man may be chastised as a coward for 
leaving the Commonwealth, but there is no reason why he should protect a protector 
who cannot protect him.17 
But Walzer argues that a political philosophy that is based on the primitive 
instinct in man is inadequate in explaining the heroic and honorable character of men 
and women in the history of war. People do not always cower in fear but fight 
valiantly in the face of danger. Something more must therefore be said about the 
social contract theory in order to account for the resilience and moral experience of 
citizens in the crucible of war. Hobbes would not disagree with Walzer’s optimistic 
view of human nature and humanity in a time of adversity. But he would prefer to 
take that discussion outside of his contract theory. Walzer, however, asserts that a 
social contract theory can only make sense if contract is understood as a “metaphor” 
for the common life, which he describes in Just and Unjust Wars as the “shared 
experiences” and “shared life and liberty” of the community, a “process of association 
and mutuality, the ongoing character of which the state claims to protect against 
external encroachment” (JUJW 54). The common life, in Walzer’s view, is the only 
substance that can give meaning to what is otherwise a transactional relationship 
between the sovereign and its subjects.  
Walzer’s idea is not new, since he is in essence replacing Hobbes’s natural 
egotist with Rousseau’s noble savage. Whereas Hobbes’s natural egotist is driven by 
his private and selfish interests to sustain his life, Rousseau believes that the natural 
man in the modern citizen is actually capable of defending a public cause greater than 
himself, such as the preservation of his community’s history and heritage. His 
                                                
17 “When Armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of 
treachery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonorably.” Hobbes, Leviathan, 
Chapter 21, 115 
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conviction is by no means developed overnight. Rather, it is nurtured through the 
years of active participation in the schools and public institutions of the common life. 
In “the passage from the state of nature to the civil state,” the noble savage learns to 
“substitute justice for instinct in his conduct and give his actions the morality they had 
formerly lacked,”18 all these for the higher ends of a civilized and moral life. 
Rousseau’s contract, on Walzer’s reading, is therefore “less an exchange than a moral 
transformation” (Ob 91) in the passage of time. And when an enemy threatens the 
source of his moral life, he is willing to risk his natural life for the state, “not because 
the state protects their lives… but because the state is their common life” (Ob 92).  
Rousseau’s influence on Walzer is noticeable in Just and Unjust Wars and 
Spheres of Justice. In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer unequivocally states that “the 
moral standing of any particular state depends upon the reality of the common life it 
protects and the extent to which the sacrifices required by that protection are willingly 
accepted and thought worthwhile.” Protecting the common life does not have to come 
in the form of guns. In Spheres of Justice, Walzer argues that the common life can be 
protected through the admission policies of the state. To begin with, he does not think 
that the state should open its doors to everyone from everywhere. Such a concept is 
perhaps attractive for financial centers like Tokyo, London and New York City. 
However, open citizenship is problematic because, historically, it tends to breed 
alienation among strangers or a cluster of “closed or parochial communities” (SJ 38). 
Certain criteria must therefore be set before a foreigner can be considered for 
residency or citizenship: “What kind of community do the citizens want to create? 
With what other men and women do they want to share and exchange social goods” 
                                                
18 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, translated by G.D.H. Cole, The Social Contract and Discourses (London: 
J.M. Dent, 1913), Chapter 8, 15, paraphrased.  
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(SJ 40)? By deciding whom to admit or exclude in its distribution of citizenship to 
foreigners, the state is able to preserve the integrity of the common life. 
The common life, to summarize, is therefore a thick and intangible set of 
social, moral or political values. It “is one in which the new [Rousseauian] man, a 
moral member of a moral body, achieves his fullest development” (Ob 92). Because 
of its intrinsic worth, it must be protected at all cost by the community. Walzer’s 
defense of an invisible entity in Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice 
nonetheless raises a few questions, of which the most crucial for our discussion is 
whether the common life is one that can accommodate the rights of the individual, 
particularly the marginalized. In the next segment, I will look at key discussions in 
Spheres of Justice and “The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism” to argue that 
rights are equally important for Walzer’s idea of justice.  
 
Rights of the Individual  
 
Walzer’s defense of the common life makes him an easy target for criticism. 
Although most scholars do not go as far to say that Walzer has completely abandoned 
the language of rights by the time he wrote Spheres of Justice in 1983, many would 
suggest that rights do seem to occupy a secondary role there, as compared to their 
preeminence in Just and Unjust Wars. However, I want to argue that Walzer actually 
displays an equal commitment to rights in Spheres of Justice. My argument is based 
on the proposition that the common life can also be understood as a set of 
constitutional principles that allows citizens to articulate their differences within a 
shared language of citizenship rights. In other words, the common life is a thin moral 
code that allows citizens to harmoniously co-exist with one another and communities 
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to freely pursue their own conceptions of the common good. Before I explore this 
alternative perspective of the common life, let me briefly consider two criticisms of 
the common life by Edward Said and Nancy Rosenblum. Understanding Walzer’s 
possible response to their criticisms will also help us to understand how the common 
life is ultimately one that takes the rights of individuals seriously.  
In a world where a border is sometimes all that prevents a person from 
enjoying the basic rights of a better society, Said finds it cruel that “members have 
rights that strangers don’t, or can’t have,”19 in Spheres of Justice. Walzer, as we 
know, is a keen supporter of Israel’s independence. His personal biography leads Said 
to speculate that Walzer’s views on admission policies (the community’s right to 
exclude foreigners from membership) is also his way of explaining why members of 
the Jewish community are entitled to Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return 
while “strangers” such as Palestinian refugees are denied similar rights.20  Rosenblum, 
in the same spirit as Said, argues that Walzer’s reliance on social meanings to advance 
distributive justice is risky since social meanings are susceptible to the tyranny of 
“rhetoric and majoritarianism.”21 For her, civil liberties offer the best guarantee for 
upholding the liberties of everyone, especially those of the marginalized. Spheres of 
Justice is therefore disconcerting for Rosenblum because Walzer has “nothing [to say] 
about constitutionalism or… civil liberties.”22 She concludes that his idea of shared 
morality is one that “neither protects particular interests nor creates public opinion.” It 
                                                
19 Edward W. Said, “Michael Walzer’s Exodus and Revolution,” in Blaming the victims: spurious 
scholarship and the Palestinian question, eds. Edward W. Said and Christopher Hitchens (London: 
Verso, 2001), 175.  
20 Ibid., 175 –176.  
21 Ibid., 595. 
22 Nancy Rosenblum, “Moral Membership in a postliberal State,” 595. 
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is in fact a form of heavy-handed communitarianism that “pushes liberty into the 
background.”23  
However, in response to Said, our knowledge of Walzer ought to prevent us 
from making the assertion that Spheres of Justice is a book that springs out from the 
exclusionary politics of Israel or the racist politics of Hitler’s Germany. Earlier, I have 
already considered his concern for stateless refugees. “Statelessness,” Walzer warns, 
“is a condition of infinite danger.” Thus, “in certain circumstances, strangers… [are] 
entitled to our hospitality, assistance, and good will” (SJ 32 – 33). In light of Walzer’s 
repeated concern for the powerless and the dispossessed, it is difficult to understand 
why Said insists that Palestinian refugees are “explicitly excluded from the world of 
moral concern”24 in Walzer’s political thought. Nor is Rosenblum’s view sustainable, 
since Walzer does pay significant attention to the rights of the marginalized in 
Spheres of Justice. For instance, he finds that foreign workers (what he calls “guest 
workers”) who work in “exhausting, dangerous, and degrading” jobs (SJ 56) generally 
do not have the rights or capacity to organize themselves in the way that citizens do in 
unions. They are therefore vulnerable to exploitation by members of the political 
community on matters like wage determination and social privileges. This, to Walzer, 
is unjust, for citizens “can’t claim territorial jurisdiction and rule over the people with 
whom they share the territory. To do this is to act… beyond their rights. It is a form of 
tyranny” (SJ 62). The basic civil liberties that citizens enjoy must therefore be 
extended to foreign workers. Even better would be an international agreement 
between the host country and the foreign workers’ home countries that could 
guarantee their liberties (SJ 60). 
                                                
23 Ibid., 594. 
24 Said, “Michael Walzer’s Exodus and Revolution,” 176.  
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 Although Said’s and Rosenblum’s criticisms can be rejected based on 
arguments in Spheres of Justice alone, what I find more challenging is to strengthen 
their criticisms and consider how Walzer would respond to these stronger criticisms. 
Will Kymlicka’s comprehensive essay on communitarianism is instructive here.25 In 
his essay, he raises a question that is similar to Said’s line of argument: “Why,” he 
asks, “should someone in Maine feel more solidarity with a resident of Texas, 4,000 
miles away, than with a resident of New Brunswick, 5 miles across the border with 
Canada?”26 Kymlicka goes on to suggest that the fact that Maine residents probably 
have more in common with the central-liberal thinking of New Brunswick residents 
than the conservative mentality of Texans suggests that what is regarded as 
“common” in a community is sometimes shared across communities rather than 
within. If the difference between citizens and foreigners is actually arbitrary, Said is at 
least right to contend that Walzer has exaggerated the distinction between “members” 
and “strangers” in his views on admission policies.  
  Also, Kymlicka, in response to Michael Sandel’s communitarian politics, 
questions whether homosexual communities could actually enjoy the same kind of 
social acceptance that heterosexuals presumably enjoy in Sandel’s community.27 
Kymlicka’s provocative question is raised with the aim of challenging the 
communitarian concept of the common good. Communitarians often argue that the 
liberal conception of the unencumbered self can only pursue a moral and purposeful 
life within the common good of the community. But this strikes Kymlicka (and many 
other liberals) as indefensible because it rests on a romanticized view of earlier 
societies such as the republican democracies of ancient Greece or eighteenth-century 
                                                
25 See Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press), 
Chapter 6.  
26 Ibid., 255. 
27 Ibid., 260. 
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New England town governments. These societies, Kymlicka reminds us, are able to 
sustain the common good only “because women, atheists, [and] Indians… were all 
excluded from membership.” Had they been accepted into the community, “they 
would not have been impressed by the pursuit of what was often a racist and sexist 
common good.”28 Any attempt to replicate a vision of the common good, no matter 
how noble it seems, is likely to exclude the values and views of a minority group. So, 
although Walzer’s political community is (contrary to Rosenblum’s view) one that 
defends the basic rights of refugees and civil liberties of guest workers, it is unclear in 
Spheres of Justice if the same community is also one that defends the rights of 
residents who do not share its vision of the common good.  
 But in “The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” we find that Walzer’s 
political community is clearly a socially progressive one that seeks to eradicate the 
kind of overbearing communitarianism found in the politics of the common good. In 
fact, he too argues that Sandel is wrong to think that a return to a “lost Eden” (TP 99) 
could actually rectify the moral looseness of contemporary liberal societies. By 
advocating a politics of the common good, communitarians have pushed themselves 
into the unfashionable and undesirable intellectual corner of “neoconservative 
lamentation, neo-Marxist indictment, and neoclassical or republican hand-wringing” 
(TP 99). Nevertheless, he concurs with communitarian scholars that the liberal 
conception of the unencumbered self is flawed. In every society, Walzer believes that 
there is a minimal form of moral structure for people to “disagree in mutually 
comprehensible ways” (TP 104). Within the context of his political experience in 
American society, he suggests that the purportedly unencumbered self is necessarily a 
situated self because “[the] language of individual rights—voluntary association, 
                                                
28 Ibid., 258. 
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pluralism, toleration, separation, privacy, free speech, the career-open-to-talents, and 
so on—is simply inescapable” (TP 104). He makes a similar argument in “A Critique 
of Philosophical Conversation,” which I find useful to quote in full:  
 
Common language and judgment, agreements and understandings, 
strong and extensive meetings of minds, are nonetheless necessary to 
any human society. It is not the case, obviously, that people agree on 
this or that policy, but they must agree at a deeper level on the rough 
contours of a way of life and a view of the world. Some things they 
must understand together or else their disagreements will be incoherent 
and their arguments impossible. They can have no politics unless they 
also have what political scientists call a ‘consensus’ on institutional 
arrangements and lines of authority (TP 32). 
 
What is significant about this passage is its suggestion for a deeper reading of the 
common life. In this sense, the common life is not an intangible and tacit set of moral 
ideas for the purpose of mutual cooperation but a recognizable set of political 
principles for the purpose of peaceful co-existence. Later, in Chapter Two, I will 
explain how this common life is expressed in the Constitution of the United States 
and how the Constitution itself is crucial for Walzer to develop his lists of “blocked 
exchanges” and “blocked uses of power” in the spheres of money and political power. 
For now, we can say that this different understanding of the common life is also his 
response to the stronger account of Said’s criticism. It does not matter if the boundary 
between members and strangers is arbitrary in character or that the “common” life of 
the community is a misnomer for a set of civil liberties that is found in many Western 
societies like Canada, Norway and Sweden. What is more important is the fact that 
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this common life is inclusive and socially progressive, where different groups can 
pursue their own versions of the common good within the common life. In my view, 
Walzer’s subtle switch from the common good to the common life is his way of 
distancing himself from the kind of heavy-handed communitarianism that insists on a 
dominant common good for the entire political community.  
 On hindsight, Walzer could have defined his ideas more clearly, instead of 
merging two different understandings of the common life into one. But once we have 
systematized his ideas, it is reasonable to say that the ethical discussions in Spheres of 
Justice—like those in Just and Unjust Wars—is one that takes into serious 
consideration the rights of individuals and the civil liberties of all members. However, 
equal opportunity to the pursuit of life, liberty and happiness has seldom been 
translated into equal success in contemporary societies. In “Exclusion, Injustice, and 
the Democratic State,” Walzer observes that although liberal democracies have tried 
to reduce the reproduction of marginality and exclusion through public policies that 
are grounded in the liberal principles of cultural pluralism, religious toleration, 
meritocracy, universal suffrage and so forth, the fact that “the dispossessed, the 
underclass, the truly disadvantaged, the socially isolated, the estranged poor” still 
exist in these societies suggests that modern democracies are still “far from complex 
equality” (TP 82 – 83). Part of the reason, Walzer suggests, is the persistence of social 
iniquities like “stereotyping, discrimination, and disregard” (TP 86). It is also 
unfortunate that these behaviors are not easily regulated by the laws of the state. 
Walzer, however, does not think that the state should allow the invisible forces of 
social behaviors to shape the ends of the marginalized; rather, he argues that “the state 
must play a larger role in advancing the cause of complex equality… to enable their 
members to re-enter society and to function independently.” (TP 83, 88). Here, the 
 32 
authority of the state is pivotal, especially in ensuring the just distribution of two 
crucial social goods: welfare and basic education (TP 88). However, for better or for 
worse, state authority is necessarily coercive. In the next section, I will study the final 
central idea in Walzer’s political thought—the authority of the state—to understand 
the moral basis of state coercion.  
 
Authority of the State  
 
State authority implies a right to prescribe obligations for citizens and, if necessary to 
enforce those obligations, to exercise coercion over its citizens.29 The legalist 
paradigm in Just and Unjust Wars accepts this assumption that the state has the 
authority to police its citizens and to mobilize them to defend its sovereignty in a time 
of war. A fundamental issue in political theory is the question of when coercion is 
justifiable. On this issue, Walzer joins many others in conceiving the morally 
legitimate use of force against foreign states as “just war” and against citizens as “law 
enforcement.” In this segment, I will explore the justification of coercion by studying 
Walzer’s views on welfare politics in Spheres of Justice. I want to argue that coercion 
is justified (that is to say, the state has the authority to enforce civil and criminal law 
against its own members) whenever it is used to sustain and protect the moral fabric 
of the community.30  
                                                
29 To clarify, in my usage of the “state” in discussing authority, I am not referring to the theoretical 
assumption of the state as a constituted community, as discussed in the earlier part of this Chapter 
(Section 1.1). I am referring to the institutions of the state (such as the legislature, the judiciary and the 
police) that protect and uphold the values of the community’s constitution. 
30 Although my focus here is on domestic political authority in Spheres of Justice, I will also briefly 
discuss Walzer’s views in Just and Unjust Wars concerning authoritarian governments that enforce 
draconian laws against their own members. A more elaborated account of authoritarianism (in Just and 
Unjust Wars) will be provided in Chapter 2.  
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Domestic laws must be enforced carefully because the state is a non-voluntary 
association. Laws such as those in Hitler’s Germany or Stalin’s Soviet Union are 
fundamentally unjust, or tyrannical, since they do not respect the basic liberties of 
citizens but instead impose the particular purposes of those in power. Although it is 
difficult to determine the moral legitimacy of purposes for which civil and criminal 
laws are made and enforced, a useful guide by Kant is as follows: coercion is 
justifiable as long as it is “a hindrance to a hindrance of freedom.”31 By freedom, 
Kant is referring to the basic tenets of common morality, grounded in the following 
principle: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same 
time as an end.32 Common morality, for Kant, is derived through the exercise of 
reason and is therefore independent of history and customs; slavery is—and was—
always unjust, whether we are living in the twenty first century or in eighteenth-
century America.33 Walzer, however, takes a more historical approach. He argues that 
morality is rooted in reality, shared across cultures and discovered through the 
“unchanging character of the lies soldiers and statesmen tell” (JUJW 19). Despite the 
different methods, Kant and Walzer agree on the importance of fundamental liberties, 
such as the freedom from murder and other violent abuse.  
Most scholars would agree that a minimum degree of state coercion (say, 
compulsory taxation to finance enforcement) is justifiable if: 1) it is used for the 
purpose of hindering the hindrance of basic liberties, or 2) it does not gravely 
contravene the democratic decisions of the citizens. However, they disagree on 
whether a more extensive use of state coercion can be justified. For instance, Nozick, 
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32 Immanuel Kant, translated and analyzed by H.J. Paton, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals 
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a key proponent of classical liberalism, argues in Anarchy, State and Utopia that the 
idea of coercion for the sake of the “greater good” is incoherent since there is no 
greater good in a community; “there are only individual people, different individual 
people, with their own individual lives.”34 Taxation for the purpose of redistributing 
wealth is unjust and “on a par with forced labor”35 because in imposing taxes the state 
is effectively using the labor of one citizen to benefit another.36  
In contrast, social liberals like Walzer and Rawls prefer a more extensive use 
of coercion to promote justice. For unrestrained capitalism in a Nozickian state will 
result in a serious imbalance of power and equality. What could democracy mean if 
the poor could not afford public transport to the voting booth? Is it fair that schools 
are only available to those who can afford to attend? In Walzer’s view, the state has a 
duty to provide a basic level of social support for weaker members of the community, 
since their freedom could be hindered through no one’s fault in particular. Although 
Walzer does not refer to Isaiah Berlin, we can assume that the kind of freedom 
implied in Spheres of Justice is positive in character, referring to an individual’s 
capacity to pursue his or her own desired ends.37 Positive freedom is possible when an 
individual’s basic needs are met, such as his or her opportunity to attend schools, or 
accessibility to medical care, legal aid and clean water. State coercion, usually in the 
form of taxation, is justifiable when it is used to sustain a minimal degree of positive 
freedom, most pertinently in the area of welfare and basic education. Let me further 
consider the association between political authority and welfare politics.  
From a social liberal perspective, Walzer argues that healthcare provision 
should be based on the principle of need and not on free exchange. Although a 
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37 See Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), on 
the distinction between negative and positive freedom, 122 – 134.  
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healthcare system that functions according to the principle of need is necessarily 
coercive (since welfare provisions are provided for the lower classes of American 
society at the expense of the rich), coercion of this sort is justifiable. For unrestrained 
free exchange will raise the prices of medical products, which constitutes an injustice 
to those who cannot afford. No one, in Walzer’s view, should suffer from a treatable 
injury or illness because of his or her poverty (SJ 86 – 91). Unfortunately, this is not 
what he observes in the United States, where better healthcare is generally more 
accessible for the rich. State intervention is therefore necessary to prevent the 
principle of free exchange operating freely in the provision of healthcare. The private 
consumption of quality healthcare is permissible only if it operates “above and 
beyond” the level of minimum provision and that it does not distort the distributive 
patterns of healthcare for the poor (SJ 90).  
Although Walzer is in agreement with social liberals that state coercion is 
justifiable as long as there are needs to be met among vulnerable groups and that 
redistributive mechanisms are not too demanding, he also argues that some social 
liberals may have misconceived the moral basis of welfare politics. Here, he has 
Rawls’s framework in mind: “Rational men and women in the original position, 
deprived of all particular knowledge of their social standing and cultural 
understanding, [who] would probably opt, as Rawls has argued, for an equal 
distribution of whatever goods they were told they needed” (SJ 79). For Walzer, a 
theory of justice that proceeds from this transactional, impersonal and Hobbes-like 
view of human relationship is flawed because it fails to capture the importance of the 
community. Without the sense of a community, one can imagine citizens paying taxes 
not only to secure medical benefits but also to avoid punishment for noncompliance. 
But “the reasons for coercion go much deeper than this,” Walzer insists, for the 
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community “is something more than a mutual benefit club” (SJ 81). This “something 
more,” as one could anticipate, is the community’s common life.  
Once again, Obligations is instructive in underscoring the importance of the 
common life in welfare politics.  There, Walzer concurs with Rousseau that a social 
contract “must involve some acknowledgement of the reality of the common life and 
of the moral transformation which it makes possible… [The] contract must be acted 
out, the common life must be lived, before it can be said to generate ultimate 
obligation” (Ob 97). The transformation from the noble savage to the moral civilian is 
crucial for Walzer’s idea of justice: it is not mutual benefit per se that motivates 
citizens to contribute towards communal provision; rather, it is their recognition of 
fellow citizens as members of a community that motivates them to help the needy. 
The Rousseauian perspective, while unstated in Spheres of Justice, is evident in 
Walzer’s interpretation of the social contract: “The contract is a moral bond. It 
contains the strong and the weak, the lucky and the unlucky, the rich and the poor, 
creating a union that transcends all differences of interest, drawing its strength from 
history, culture, religion, language, and so on. Arguments about communal provision 
are, at the deepest level, interpretation of that union” (SJ 83). Distributive justice, in 
other words, is necessarily a function of the common life. How justice is realized is 
ultimately dependent on the state’s capacity to discern the social meanings of the 
common life.  
An implicit assumption that Walzer does not discuss in Spheres of Justice is 
the state’s right to punish citizens who challenge its authority. It is difficult to imagine 
a system of laws that excludes punishment. The idea of coercion is meaningless if 
citizens can escape taxation, conscription, or harm others without incurring penalties. 
Unfortunately, historically, state punishments are often meted out for the wrong 
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reasons. Earlier, I’ve explained how the common life must be protected at all cost in 
Just and Unjust Wars for “if no common life exists, or if the state doesn’t defend the 
common life that does exist, its own defense may have no moral justification” (JUJW 
54). But rather than mobilizing soldiers to draw up guns to fight an external enemy, 
the state has often ordered the political police to bring out the guillotine to execute its 
dissidents. Here, our discussion turns because no longer are we assuming that the state 
has the authority to distribute justice. Instead, we assume that it has lost its standing 
among a sizable portion of its community. What is Walzer’s response towards 
communities who live under the constant tyranny of oppressive regimes?  
In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer unequivocally argues that international 
society cannot challenge authoritarian governments except in extreme circumstances: 
“Only domestic tyrants are safe [from military intervention], for it is not our purpose 
in international society… to establish liberal or democratic communities, but only 
independent ones” (JUJW 94). Freedom of expression may be severely curtailed and 
punishments may be meted out disproportionately for dissidents, but international 
society has no right to intervene except through other means such as diplomatic 
pressures and economic sanctions (TP 238). Walzer’s tolerance for tyrannies has been 
criticized by Doppelt, Wasserstrom, Beitz and Luban. The main object of their 
criticism is Walzer’s strict adherence to the principle of non-intervention, even when 
the authority of a state is highly questionable. 38 
However, we need to be meticulous in our understanding of tyranny. Tyranny, 
as mentioned earlier, is unjustified coercion. But tyranny has two forms, “with 
nastiness on one side and genocide on the other” (TP 238). Walzer has no issue with 
military intervention for the latter, since the state has lost its authority completely; 
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that is to say, the state cannot invoke the community to defend itself. However, with 
regards to cases of “nastiness,” Walzer argues that the legitimacy of the state must be 
respected by international society even if its laws are draconian and do not reflect the 
standards of the common life. His primary reason against intervention is not so much 
a respect for the authority of the government but the sacredness of common life itself. 
Lives may be lost in the struggle between the people and the iron fist of the state, such 
as the days of the French Revolution in 1789, the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 
1966 and the Burmese Saffron Revolution in 2007. Still, Walzer argues in “The Moral 
Standing of States” that foreigners should not militarily intervene on behalf of either 
side, for they are not participants but observers of the common life: “They don’t know 
enough about its history, and they have no direct experience, and can form no 
concrete judgments, of the conflicts and harmonies, the historical choices and cultural 
affinities, the loyalties and resentments, that underlie it” (TP 221). An imprudent 
military intervention, in Walzer’s view, would short-circuit the formative process of 
members involved in the political struggle and the subsequent evolution of its 
common life.  
Later, in Chapter Two, I will further discuss Walzer’s moral arguments 
regarding the presence of tyranny in the world of politics, as well as my views on his 
toleration of tyrannical regimes. For now, within the domain of political theory, it 
suffices for us to know that for Walzer, the authority of the state entails coercion, not 
just in its minimal duty of maintaining security but also in the area of welfare 
provisions. Insofar as there are needs that individuals or communities cannot provide 
for themselves, the state will always be a coercive institution to supply those 
provisions (SJ 68). The justification for coercion is not strictly based on a Kantian 
doctrine of respecting the individual as an end in himself or herself, but on a 
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Rousseauian perspective that the state is obligated to protect the community, which 
includes its common life. The common life will in turn shape and determine the type 
of distributive principle that is most relevant to the community: whether it should be 
based on need, free exchange, desert, or a combination of the three. Coercion is 
justifiable as long as it is consistent with the standards of the common life. The 
authority of the state, even when its coercion is unjustifiable, cannot be challenged 
from outside for the main reason that intervention would deny the “right of 




In this chapter, I tried to establish a conceptual relationship between Just and Unjust 
Wars and Spheres of Justice by identifying three dominant ideas that are consistently 
implied in the books. In the process, I also tried to relieve Walzer from the charge of 
statism or communitarianism by providing a more balanced view that his political 
thought is one that pays equal attention to the authority of the state, rights of the 
individual and common life of the community. Relieving Walzer from the criticism of 
statism or communitarianism does not, however, resolve the tension between what 
coercion seeks to achieve and what common morality demands. As Nozick contends, 
some liberties are lost even when coercion is used for the greater good in welfare 
politics. Basic liberties are lost too, in Walzer’s tolerance of overly coercive societies 
and tyrannies. The tension between coercion and morality is a conceptual one. It is the 
result of an interaction between authority, rights and common life in Walzer’s idea of 
justice, which I earlier envisioned in relation to the analogy of the interaction between 
the Sun, planets and moons in the solar system.  
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Just as the gravitational tensions of the heavenly bodies create a stable solar 
system, Walzer’s system of political ideas is assumed to be stable in Just and Unjust 
Wars and Spheres of Justice. What Luban chastises as a “romance of the nation state” 
in Just and Unjust Wars is simply an assumption that each of the core ideas in 
Walzer’s concept of the state as the constituted community has an equal and 
important function in international ethics. An external aggressor that seeks to disrupt 
the stability of this system, either in the form of military force or the threat of force, is 
therefore liable to a war of self-defense by the victim state or if necessary, further 
punishments by international society.  
The harmony of authority, rights and common life is also evident in Spheres of 
Justice. Although the fundamental end of distributive justice is to secure the rights of 
the individual, Walzer argues that social justice can only be realized if there is a 
genuine existence of a common life, and that the authorities of the state are conversant 
with the mores of this common life. Walzer, to be noted, is speaking from his 
experience of an American citizen in Spheres of Justice. He does not provide enough 
details on how the relationship between authority, rights and common life might 
change in other cultures, besides a few comments on how justice is possible even 
within a relatively illiberal society such as the caste community in India. Although 
Walzer’s justification of caste justice is debatable39, what is more important for our 
present discussion is that in Spheres of Justice he at least demonstrates a consistent 
view that we ought to tolerate illiberal societies for the same reason that he gives in 
Just and Unjust Wars and “The Moral Standing of States.” This reason is based on the 
understanding that we can never know for sure how the configuration of authority, 
rights and common life operates in other societies or political systems. There is 
                                                
39 I will explain his toleration of traditional caste societies in detail in Chapter 3.  
 41 
therefore a need for tolerance in international society and “a decent respect for the 
opinions of mankind… opinions that are the reflections in individual minds, shaped 
also by individual thought, of the social meanings that constitute our common life” 
(SJ 320). 
 In the next chapter, I will shift my study from a conceptual tension between 
authority, rights and common life to a practical tension between the elements that 
correspond to the ideas themselves: state, community and individual. To put it 
differently, I will shift my focus from the realm of political theory to the world of 
politics. Unlike ideas in political theory, elements in the world of politics are not 
harmonious with one another. The community may be overbearing, the institutions of 
the state may turn against the citizen, and the individual may not identify with the 
ethos of the community. Such a practical disjunction does not deter Walzer from 
making reasonable moral arguments in Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice. 
In the next chapter, I will study how he uses the ideas of authority, rights and 
common life in his political thought to make moral judgments about human tensions 
in the political world.  
 42 
Chapter 2 
Resolving the State-Community Tension 
 
I have argued that the ideas of authority, rights and common life are central to 
Walzer’s theory of the state as a constituted community but also that these ideas are in 
tension with one another. My aim, however, is to show that the relationship between 
Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice lies not in the tension between these 
ideas but in a parallel tension within the practical world of politics. But the latter, 
practical, tension cannot be understood without understanding the former, conceptual, 
tension. I explored that conceptual tension in several ways, of which the most 
important is the understanding that state authority necessarily entails coercion. In 
Walzer’s view, coercion is justifiable as long as it is a hindrance to the hindrance of 
freedom. It is also justifiable if that means that some resources are channeled to 
sustain and nourish the moral fabric of the common life, without which it is difficult 
for the Rosseauian citizen to develop his or her moral being. However, coercion also 
means that some individual liberties are lost for the state to effectively carry out its 
duties.  
 In this chapter, I will shift my focus from conceptual tensions to practical 
ones. In particular, I want to look at a tension that dominates Walzer’s moral 
arguments in Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice, that between the state and 
the community. To facilitate my subsequent exposition, I define the state-community 
tension as a situation in which some citizens disagree with particular laws or policies, 
or in which a malevolent government oversteps its right of coercion and tyrannizes 
the community. The former situation is discussed in Spheres of Justice, where the 
tension is an “everyday” one between the authority of the state and thick communal 
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standards, and the latter in Just and Unjust Wars, where the tension is a “radical” one 
between the authority of the state and respect for minimal standards of domestic 
political life. For Walzer, protecting the community against unjustified coercion is 
also his way of protecting the individual. Therefore, the state-community tension can 
also be understood as shorthand for a practical tension between state, community and 
individual. 
As a public intellectual, Walzer is more interested in practical than in 
conceptual tensions. He says, for example, that Just and Unjust Wars “is a book of 
practical morality.” Although “the study of judgments and justifications in the real 
world moves us closer, perhaps, to the most profound questions of moral philosophy, 
… it does not require a direct engagement with those questions” (JUJW xxiii). He 
makes a similar point in Spheres of Justice, appealing to practical relevance rather 
than philosophical consistency in thinking about distributive justice: “Justice and 
equality can conceivably be worked out as philosophical artifacts, but a just or an 
egalitarian society cannot be… I mean to stand in the cave, in the city, on the ground” 
(SJ xiv, paraphrased). For Walzer, philosophizing from the Sun would distract him 
from the role of a moralist in the Cave: using moral principles to make judgments and 
prescribe solutions to cases of injustice. With Walzer the moralist in mind, I argue in 
this chapter that Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice can be read as a single 
and consistent discourse on a practical tension in human relationships, where politics 
is often characterized by situations of communal resistance to tyranny or government 
resistance to sedition.  
Although this practical tension is intricately woven through Walzer’s 
conceptual investigations in Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice, it can be 
extracted and examined using his own “interpretative” approach to domestic and 
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international injustice. Interpretation involves an eclectic mix of moral, legal, and 
prudential reasoning, based on the ideas of authority, common life and rights. 
Practical tensions can be relieved if the method of interpretation is carefully applied. 
To demonstrate this method, I will consider one particular everyday tension in 
Spheres of Justice, that between the state and the community in an American 
capitalist democracy. Walzer’s detailed analysis of an association between market and 
political power in the United States, where capitalists and politicians enjoy significant 
influence that is incompatible with America’s democratic culture, is at the same time 
his justification for the separation of money and politics. How is the separation 
achieved? What are the moral arguments underlying the separation? I will answer 
these questions through his interpretation of what American egalitarianism means.  
I will then turn my attention to a radical tension, discussed in The Company of 
Critics, between an unjust French colonial government and an oppressed Algerian 
community. This tension is the subject of the chapter “Albert Camus’s Algerian 
War.” Walzer’s interpretation of that war will be studied along with his revisionist 
view of the legalist paradigm in Just and Unjust Wars. We need to bear in mind that 
the legalist paradigm demands revision in part because atrocities are often committed 
within the legal boundaries of a state. However, Walzer’s appeal for bi-national 
partition (CC 147) rather than complete Algerian independence may come across as a 
return to an unrevised legalist paradigm or even an endorsement for domestic 
injustice. Why the return? What is the moral justification for partition? Is his 
interpretation of the war accurate? Answering these questions will allow me to assess 
the overall strengths and weaknesses of his interpretative methodology. Before I 
examine these tensions, let me explain what interpretation broadly entails, as the 
method is deployed in Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice.  
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2.1 Understanding Interpretation as Moral Judgment 
 
At the heart of Walzer’s political thought is an emphasis on making good moral 
judgments. However, his moral judgments are sometimes influenced by non-moral 
considerations. In Just and Unjust Wars, morality is suspended when communal 
necessity becomes overwhelming in a supreme emergency. In Spheres of Justice, the 
caste society is justified when viewed from the perspective of anthropology rather 
than that of moral philosophy. The arguments are different, but in both cases the 
context determines how the argument will go. This does not mean that Walzer’s 
judgments are unprincipled, for his switch between moral and non-moral 
considerations is developed within a sophisticated interpretative methodology.  
Walzer’s interpretative methodology differs from one work to another, 
however, and inattention to these differences may hinder us from appreciating the 
moral spirit of his political thought. For instance, interpretation in Spheres of Justice 
depends on moral resources that are substantially different from Just and Unjust 
Wars. The former uses particularistic principles distilled from the mores of American 
society; the latter uses universal principles abstracted from the mores of different 
societies. To avoid confusions that might arise from my subsequent explanation of 
interpretation, I find it useful to replace the expression “interpretation” with 
“casuistry” for Just and Unjust Wars but retain the expression for Spheres of Justice. 
In the rest of this section, I present an overview of casuistry in Just and Unjust Wars 
and interpretation in Spheres of Justice as a starting point for understanding the 
practical dimension of Walzer’s political thought.  
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Casuistry in Just and Unjust Wars 
 
In Just and Unjust Wars, interpretation usually involves the following: 1) 
understanding moral principles; 2) determining the circumstances in particular cases 
(that is to say, interpreting what is going on rather than interpreting moral principles); 
3) applying moral principles upon the judgment of circumstance. The third step is also 
known as casuistry, which is “the study of individual cases of conscience in which 
more than one settled moral principle (or perhaps none) applies.”40  
Traditionally, casuistry has been understood as a technique for resolving 
difficult cases in moral philosophy. Consider the following situations. An explorer 
must make a decision to kill one of twenty innocent captives in a lawless tribe; failure 
to do so will result in the execution of all twenty by the tribal head. A group of 
shipwrecked seamen must make the decision to kill and eat a shipmate to avoid dying 
from starvation. A group of cave explorers are trapped by an unexpected rockfall with 
rising water. The only way to escape drowning is to dislodge the rocks with an 
explosion that will kill a teammate trapped in the passageway.41 In each of these 
cases, reaching a conclusion requires the “the discovery of sound methods” between 
the case-in-question and its earlier precedents, “along which these principles can truly 
be interpreted and applied as need arises, or along which conflict of principle can be 
solved.”42  
In a similar manner, moral arguments in Just and Unjust Wars are advanced 
through casuistry (JUJW xxiv). In other words, the morality of war is explained and 
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41 These cases are taken from Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago 
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42 Kenneth Escott Kirk, Conscience and its Problems: An Introduction to Casuistry (London: 
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 47 
illustrated in plain and simple terms through the use of different case studies. Often, 
Walzer selects historical accounts that are morally controversial or problematic. For 
instance, his view that Erwin Rommel, a general in Hitler’s regime, “fought a bad war 
well, not only militarily but also morally” (JUJW 38) may be counter-intuitive to 
one’s sense of justice: How, someone might ask, can a Nazi general ever be moral? 
But according to Walzer, Rommel has fought according to the rules of war, even to 
the point of disobeying Hitler’s order to shoot enemy soldiers behind the German line. 
Rommel’s conduct therefore made him “an honorable man” (JUJW 38) despite his 
service to an immoral ruler. A parallel argument is made in Walzer’s disapproval of 
Winston Churchill’s order for the laying of mines in Norwegian waters during the 
early winter months of 1940. Churchill’s intention was to force German merchant 
ships based in the Norwegian port of Narvik out into international waters for the 
British navy to sink or capture, since they were shipping crucial iron ore to German 
forces while enjoying immunity under the neutral status of Norway. Churchill’s 
strategy may seem like a morally acceptable strategy even if he did not anticipate the 
lightning response of German retaliation and the subsequent occupation of Norway. 
But Walzer argues that Churchill had erred by violating Norway’s neutral status; 
Norway’s sovereignty should have been respected even if its neutrality was a 
hindrance to British victory. The chivalry of Rommel and the imprudence of 
Churchill are two out of many intriguing accounts in Walzer’s casuistic approach to 
just war studies; with a detailed yet vivid investigation of war and morality, he is able 
to dispel the moral fog of war to reveal a coherent landscape of a just war tradition.  
What is the guiding moral force behind Walzer’s casuistry? In my view, his 
casuistry is largely grounded within a deontological moral framework or what he calls 
the “doctrine of human rights” (xxiv). The proposition of deontology is that the 
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pursuit of desired ends must always go within the bounds of morality, specifically by 
respecting the human being as an end in himself or herself. Walzer’s deontology is 
also his way of distinguishing himself from the realism of Thucydides and Hobbes. 
Realism, with its emphasis on necessity, is a doctrine that pushes morality to the 
fringes of international political theory. War, in the words of the Athenians in 
Thucydides’s History, “is no fair fight, with honor on one side and shame on the 
other. It is rather a question of saving your lives and not resisting those who are far 
too strong for you.”43 In other words, war is about might and not right. But Walzer 
argues that realism evades many moral questions that are raised even among 
hardheaded realists. “Would the destruction of Melos really reduce Athenian risks? 
…Would it be right? What would other people think of Athens if it were carried out?” 
(JUJW 8). Once these questions are raised, Walzer believes that even realists are 
forced to enter into a moral discourse. This moral discourse, Walzer suggests, is 
inherently deontological and has always been at the core of international ethics. 
Deontology allows him to build up a case for the “moral equality of soldiers” as the 
foundation of jus in bello and to argue that jus ad bellum is built on the twin rights of 
territorial integrity and political sovereignty if we agree that “states actually do 
possess rights more or less as individuals do” (JUJW 58).44 The deontological thrust 
of these two separate but parallel moral doctrines explains why it is possible for Hitler 
to start an unjust war according to the principles of jus ad bellum but for Erwin 
Rommel to fight honorably according to the rules of jus in bello.  
However, and rather unfortunately, Walzer’s just war theory is deontological 
only up to a certain point. Beyond that point, in cases of extremity, consequentialism 
                                                
43 Thucydides, translated by Rex Warner, History of the Peloponnesian War (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1972), Book V, 101; 404. 
44 Jus ad bellum is concerned with the question of whether a war has been started justly or unjustly. Jus 
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takes over with Walzer adopting a realist position grounded on communal necessity. 
In moral philosophy, consequentialism is the main rival moral framework of 
deontology. Consequentialist reasoning is partly guided by the utilitarian idea that 
human beings are valuable insofar as they promote ends that are regarded to be good 
or desirable.45 I will not go into detail concerning the strengths and weaknesses of 
consequentialism as a moral doctrine but consider how Walzer’s moral judgment 
becomes equivocal when he alternates between deontology and consequentialism 
during a supreme emergency. A supreme emergency is a moral doctrine that invites 
one to imagine an evil so imminent and catastrophic that the only way to thwart it is 
to overcome it with evil. In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer gives the example of an 
impending Nazi victory that would plunge Europe into an era of fascism. In such a 
scenario, he suggests that it would be excusable for politicians to order the attack of 
German civilian cities as a last resort to impede the march of National Socialism. This 
was historically what Churchill did when he ordered the aerial raiding of Dresden. 
The British dropping of phosphorus-based incendiary bombs subsequently engulfed 
the city in a massive firestorm that eventually consumed the lives of close to a 
100,000 civilians. The assault was legally criminal and morally disgraceful in 
Walzer’s eyes. It was also unnecessary because the raid occurred late in the war when 
Germany was already near defeat. The ashes of Dresden were therefore the product of 
Churchill’s fiery vengeance, not Europe’s or Britain’s desperation.46  
Walzer’s condemnation of Churchill does not, however, negate the fact that 
his consequentialist defense of murder in situations of supreme emergency is 
painfully at odds with his overall deontological foundation. Despite the subsequent 
                                                
45 I have relied on Elizabeth Ashford’s essay, “Duties imposed by the Human Right,” in my 
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46 For Walzer’s full discussion on supreme emergency, see Just and Unjust Wars, Chapter 16.  
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years of scholarly criticisms, his position remains unchanged. In a 1988 essay, he 
argues that “no government can put the life of the community itself and of all its 
members at risk, so long as there are actions available to it, even immoral actions, that 
would avoid or reduce the risk … [since] it isn’t only individuals who are represented 
[in a community], but also the collective entity—religious, political, or cultural—that 
the individuals compose and from which they derive some portion of their character, 
practices, and beliefs” (AW 42). Casuistry, in Walzer’s moral world, allows room for 
actions that are morally impermissible but politically excusable as long as they serve 
the larger goal of preserving the collective. But for scholars like J.M Cameron, his 
casuistry is morally unstable and unreliable. For whether Churchill was vengeful or 
desperate, his attack on Dresden has ultimately presented Hitler “with a posthumous 
victory” since it paints a “hubristic picture of leaders who… sin greatly for the sake of 
the collective—this is the romanticism, full of bad pathos, theatrical, self-pitying, out 
of which National Socialism came.”47  
But Cameron’s criticism is unnecessarily harsh. Walzer repeatedly reminds us 
that his doctrine on supreme emergency applies only in the final hour of decision, not 
the first, and this suggests a moral vision that Hitler certainly lacked. My modest 
contribution to the debate between Walzer and the critics of his emergency ethics is 
that it is probably more useful to understand his doctrine practically than theoretically. 
As Walzer says, the view that we must overcome evil only with good “even if the 
heavens fall, is not for most people a plausible moral doctrine” (JUJW 230). It is the 
political constraint of communal life that forces Walzer to seriously yet prudently 
consider overriding moral principles during a supreme emergency.  
                                                
47 J.M. Cameron, “Morality and War,” New York Review of Books, December 8, 1977, web version. 
Joseph Boyle expresses a similar view. See Joseph Boyle, “Just and Unjust Wars: Casuistry and the 
Boundaries of the Moral World,” Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 1997.  
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This reading reinforces my point that Walzer’s political thought is better 
appreciated from the perspective of a moral practitioner than from that of a moral 
philosopher. For Walzer, philosophy must serve the needs of the people for whom its 
principles are designed. In this sense, he has no issue with the just war philosophies of 
Maimonides, Aquinas, Vitoria, Suarez and Grotius as long as they provide a practical 
structure for us to understand the morality of war (JUJW xxii). But he is also aware 
that philosophy in general often also “miss[es] the immediacies of political and moral 
controversy and provide[s] little help to men and women faced with hard choices” 
(JUJW xxiii). The practical dimension of considering the “hard choices” of everyday 
men and women—not philosophers—explains Walzer’s occasional revision or 
rejection of moral principles.  
But even when Walzer relaxes his deontological foundation for the broader 
sake of practical relevance, his form of casuistry—with its reliance on a few basic 
human rights (and a few principles of utilitarianism)—is in his view too bare-boned 
and therefore “of limited help” (SJ xv) in interpreting many other ethical issues. This 
explains why in Spheres of Justice, he prefers a richer set of moral resources that 
includes the “authoritative texts, memories, values, practices [and] conventions” (ISC 
82, n. 15) of the different communities he studies. Before I explain how these 
resources are interpreted in Spheres of Justice, it will be helpful to understand his 
view of the duty of a social critic in that book. Understanding this duty, which Walzer 
often contrasts with the philosopher’s profession, will help us to further understand 





Interlude: The Philosopher and the Social Critic  
 
The philosopher epitomizes everything that Walzer disapproves in intellectual life: 
passivity in advocacy, indifference towards people and abstraction in thought. The 
last feature is also explained in the opening pages of Spheres of Justice as a 
preliminary to his argument for an alternative style of moral inquiry:  
 
One way to begin the philosophical enterprise… is to walk out of the 
Cave, leave the city, climb the mountain, fashion for oneself… an 
objective and universal standpoint. Then one describes the terrain of 
everyday life from far away, so that it loses its particular contours and 
takes on a general shape. But I mean to stand in the Cave… to interpret 
to one’s fellow citizens the world of meanings that we share. Justice 
and equality can conceivably be worked out as philosophical artifacts, 
but a just or an egalitarian society cannot be (SJ xiv).  
 
In Walzer’s view, the philosopher is someone who understands absolute morality 
from outside Plato’s Cave but fails to connect it to the mores of the Cave. Rawls, 
famous for his book A Theory of Justice, is occasionally criticized by Walzer as an 
overly abstract philosopher whose famous ‘difference principle’ is far too simple to 
address the complex social issues of American politics (SJ 79, ISC 28). The 
ineffectiveness of the Rawlsian kind of moral philosophy explains Walzer’s own 
project in Spheres of Justice, which is to theorize distributive justice from within the 
experience of American politics and morality.  
Although I appreciate Walzer’s concrete way of conceptualizing justice, I find 
his view of philosophy misconceived. In fact, his view has been anticipated and 
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corrected by Plato in The Republic. There, in a dialogue between Adeimantus and 
Socrates, Adeimantus suggests that “people who take up philosophy… [are] incapable 
of performing any service to their communities”48 for similar reasons that  Walzer 
gives. Socrates, in response, suggests that the fault does not lie in the honorable 
character of the “philosopher king” but in the unenlightened disposition of the 
cavemen. Socrates goes on to explain that the philosopher king is not only a 
philosopher who understands absolute morality from the Sun but one who reenters the 
Cave to lead the people justly. Philosopher kings are capable of applying absolute 
morality with the greatest integrity, competency and leadership.49 The problem, 
however, is that few could ever become philosopher kings.50 One must be a great 
philosopher before one could be a philosopher king. Upon ascension to the throne, the 
madness of politics naturally inhibits the philosopher king, for he is either tempted by 
the corruptive forces of power or rejected by the foolishness of his subjects.51 
There is, in other words, a subtle difference between the philosopher and the 
philosopher king. The philosopher is one who seeks to understand morality and the 
philosopher king is one who seeks to apply morality in a reasonable manner; in other 
words, the philosopher king is one who moralizes. Understanding and moralizing are 
different modes of inquiry. Understanding is epistemological and abstract in 
character; it involves the testing of natural laws and principles to see if they 
correspond to an ultimate reality or are inherently coherent. Moralizing is practical 
and concrete in character; it involves the judgment of circumstances and the sound 
use of laws and principles to resolve moral problems.  
                                                
48 Plato, translated by Robin Waterfield, Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 487c,d; 
207 – 208. 
49 Ibid., 487a; 207 
50 “I suppose it’s indisputable that a fully philosophical nature—of the kind we’ve described, with the 
whole array of qualities we lined up not long ago—is a rare human phenomenon: there aren’t going to 
be very many of them. Don’t you agree?” Ibid., 491a; 212. 
51 Ibid., 494e; 216 – 217. 
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Walzer’s dissatisfaction with philosophy must be accurately understood as a 
gripe against the “philosopher kings” of his time, “moralizers” like Herbert Marcuse, 
a philosopher whom Walzer chastises in The Company of Critics for his detached and 
sweeping style of criticizing American society without comprehending the immediate 
experience of American culture.52 Granted that Walzer is right in his criticism of 
Marcuse, his assessment of Rawls is flawed since A Theory of Justice is not a book 
that aims to moralize or criticize but to understand the coherence of social liberalism 
as a political theory, set within the context of a Western democratic tradition. It is not 
important to speculate if Rawls was operating from the Sun or within the Cave; what 
is more important is to recognize that his style of philosophy does not require him to 
engage with the worldly concern of practical relevance, even though the world 
provides him with the raw ingredients for him to begin his moral inquiry. The goal of 
A Theory of Justice is therefore similar to Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, although the latter is more ambitious since its aim is to understand the 
coherence of universal morality. Walzer may argue that all philosophers moralize, for 
what is the purpose of understanding if understanding does not lead to social criticism 
(as a form of moralizing) in the Cave? While that may be true, the first priority of 
philosophers like Rawls and Kant is to understand, not to moralize.   
With the above distinction between understanding and moralizing in mind, it 
is easier for me to explain the duty of the social critic. A social critic is someone who 
not only stands in the Cave to moralize but—and this is a crucial but—is also actively 
involved in political action. In the words of Arthur Koestler, a Jewish novelist whom 
Walzer cites, the social critic lives with “two parallel planes” in his mind: “the plane 
of detached contemplation in the sign of infinity, and the plane of action in the name 
                                                
52 See “Herbert Marcuse’s America” in The Company of Critics, Chapter 10. 
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of certain ethical imperatives” (ISC 51). The social critic is therefore an activist, an 
advocate, a reformer or even a revolutionary. The importance of political action as a 
moral commitment is repeatedly defended in The Company of Critics, particularly in 
his positive appraisals of intellectuals like Antonio Gramsci, Martin Buber and Albert 
Camus. Action is what separates the critic from the inertness of the philosopher. The 
critic’s duty is therefore similar to the philosopher king’s—an intellectual who has 
seen the Sun but has decided to return to the Cave to unshackle the chains of his 
fellow citizens. But unlike the king, the critic is also one who actively engages the 
mores of the Cavemen, for the critic believes that the task of unshackling the chains 
of fellow citizens does not begin from the knowledge of the Sun but from the moral 
experience of the Cave. It is this conscious attempt to engage with the morality of the 
Cave that we can begin to understand Walzer’s particularistic style of interpretation in 
Spheres of Justice.  
 
Interpretation in Spheres of Justice 
 
Broadly speaking, a social critic is characterized by his or her mastery of two 
elements: the ability to establish “cultural connection” and the ability to maintain 
“critical distance” in moral judgment. The former functions as a ballast to prevent the 
critic from drifting into the sea of philosophical abstraction and the latter functions as 
a buoy to prevent the critic from sinking into the seabed of “common complaint,” 
which Walzer describes as a kind of unintelligent and fearful muttering by the masses 
(CC 12). Whereas cultural connection is easily understood, critical distance is more 
difficult to explain. Here, I will try to explain critical distance in terms of its 
relationship with cultural connection.  
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Cultural connection is essential because it is difficult to effect reforms if the 
critic is unable to invigorate the masses through the language of the people. For 
instance, Warnke suggests that while it is reasonable to say that America’s War in 
Vietnam was unjust because it violated universal standards of justice, it is also more 
compelling to say that it was unjust “because it violated the shared social 
understandings of United States citizens themselves.”53 By using familiar moral 
references, the critic is in a better position to persuade fellow citizens. Sometimes, 
however, the references are radically at odds with the common morality of mankind. 
What if the shared understanding of the United States is one that endorses the use of 
waterboarding at Guantanamo Bay? This tension between communal justice and 
common morality presents a problem for the social critic. Too connected, and a social 
critic may be criticized for reinforcing a parochial account of justice. Too detached, 
and a social critic may be dismissed for cultural irrelevance—the critic becomes the 
rejected philosopher king. How does Walzer address this tension? His solution is that 
the social critic moralizes from within the shared understandings of his or her own 
society but slightly from without as well to maintain a balanced argument. “A little to 
the side, but not outside: critical distance is measured in inches” (ISC 61). The critic 
is therefore not overly detached or connected. Social criticism is the art of balancing 
cultural connection with critical distance. 
“Criticism requires critical distance. But what does that mean?” (ISC 49) 
Walzer anticipates this question but his answer is not immediately clear. Warnke tries 
to explain critical distance by first suggesting that social criticism has an external and 
an internal dimension; each cannot hold its own ground without the other. While a 
shared American morality is sufficient to explain the injustice of the Vietnam War, 
                                                
53 Georgia Warnke, Justice and Interpretation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 33. 
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this shared morality can also include unintelligent and apologetic arguments. 
Therefore, the external dimension—the all-important critical distance—is vital to 
prevent internal criticism from breaking down into a “relativistic quandary” or a 
“bewildering array of critical and non-critical perspectives.”54 Unfortunately, Warnke 
does not offer further details on how external criticism might work for the Vietnam 
War. External criticism probably involves applying the principles of jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello but this in my view seems to render the internal perspective redundant.  
 In my view, the point of critical distance is not to discover Truth but to 
discover difference. Distance, as difference, does not require the critic to leap into the 
realm of the Sun. It is enough to tease out the moral tensions within the practices of 
the Cave. This seems to be the point that Walzer is making in his analysis of Locke’s 
Letter Concerning Toleration.  Locke’s criticism of Protestant fanaticism and 
intolerance in the Letter is outstanding in Walzer’s view because it is grounded within 
the religious text of Protestantism: 
 
“It is in vain,” [Locke] writes, “for an unbeliever to take up the 
outward show of another man’s profession. Faith only and inward 
sincerity are the things that procure acceptance with God” (ISC 53). 
 
Because of his deftness in heightening the difference between how the Christians 
were forcing unbelievers to convert and what the Bible says (by “faith only and 
inward sincerity”), Locke could establish a new moral consensus “not so much by 
discovering rights as by interpreting faith” (ISC 54). Distance, as difference, is 
therefore not detachment. Locke’s Letter, as a model of social criticism, is located 
                                                
54 Ibid., 33 and 37. 
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“within and not outside a tradition of theological discourse; within and not above the 
political fray” (ISC 55).  
If toleration is discoverable from within, Plato has perhaps set up a misleading 
dichotomy between the Truth of the Sun and the “falsehoods” of the Cave. For 
Walzer is defending a view that the critic can at least arrive at a partial truth by 
interpreting the mores of the Cave. Although the Part can never claim the objectivity 
of the Whole, the Part is at least representative of the Whole. For Walzer, a partial 
truth is sufficiently instructive for political guidance, moral understandings and social 
relationships; it is sufficient for his development of complex equality in Spheres of 
Justice. The moral force of Spheres of Justice therefore lies in a view that while social 
critics are eternally ignorant of the Whole, they can still exercise sound intellectual 
leadership with the Part. Interpretation, in Spheres of Justice, is the key towards 
discovering this Part, and applying it with a degree of moral coherence.  
To sum up what I have ascertained so far, the basis of casuistry in Just and 
Unjust Wars is found in a doctrine of human rights that is modified at the extreme by 
realism. Social criticism in Spheres of Justice involves a particularistic form of 
interpretation that is based on a robust understanding of a community’s mores. From 
Walzer’s perspective, the social critic is more important than the philosopher because 
the latter’s temperament is one of indifference; the critic is more than just a moralist, 
for he or she is committed to see reforms in his or her own society. In light of 
Walzer’s dissatisfaction with philosophy, it is easier to understand why he prefers to 
situate his intellectual work in practical ways. This brings me to the next section, 
where I will demonstrate how his interpretative approach is used to resolve state-
community tensions in Spheres of Justice and Just and Unjust Wars.  
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2.2 Interpretation in Spheres of Justice and Just and Unjust Wars 
 
As mentioned earlier, a state-community tension can take the form of either an 
everyday tension (as in Spheres of Justice, where members of a community disagree 
with certain practices of their government), or a radical tension (as in Just and Unjust 
Wars where a government that goes overboard in its unjust practices loses its popular 
legitimacy and in some cases opens itself to international intervention). For the rest of 
this chapter, I will study how Walzer aims to resolve such tensions via a careful 
interpretation of particular circumstances in politics and moral principles relevant to 
those circumstances. His judgment of politics and morality, as I will try to show, is 
also one that is grounded in the conceptual ideas of authority, common life and rights 
discussed in Chapter One.  
 
Resolving Everyday Tensions in Spheres of Justice 
 
I consider an everyday tension as one that is found in the day-to-day affairs of 
domestic politics, such as the community’s disagreement with the government’s 
policies on healthcare, education and labor policies. Everyday tensions can be further 
categorized into justifiable and unjustifiable ones. An unjustifiable tension is one 
where the government’s practices have departed significantly from the shared 
understandings of the community. Resolving an everyday tension involves bringing an 
unjustifiable tension to a justifiable level, specifically by examining how particular 
practices are at odds with the critic’s interpretation of communal justice. In studying 
how Walzer resolves tensions in Spheres of Justice, I am less interested in discussing 
the actual solutions that he proposes than in understanding the moral arguments 
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behind the solutions. As we will soon see, the moral arguments in Spheres of Justice 
are centered on his theory of complex equality. But before I explain this theory, it is 
necessary to further explain the everyday context in which complex equality operates.  
Although there are different ways to understand everyday tensions in Spheres 
of Justice, it is most useful to study it within the setting of the United States as a 
capitalist liberal democracy. In the United States, capitalism commands a pervasive 
presence and is arguably an exchange system that reinforces social injustice even if 
the system itself is not at fault. “Contemporary forms of egalitarian politics have their 
origin in the struggle against capitalism and the particular tyranny of money. And 
surely in the United States today it is the tyranny of money that most clearly invites 
[communal] resistance: property [as] power rather than power itself” (SJ 316). In this 
everyday resistance, the community is not in a direct tension with the state per se but 
in a trilateral tension with the state and the market place. Resolving this tension will 
require us to consider the nature of the relationship between the state and the market 
place. This relationship has been illustrated by Walzer’s detailed analysis of two 
entrepreneurial stories in 19th century America.  
During the late 19th century, an American trader by the name of Rowland 
Macy started a successful department store, Macy’s, in Manhattan. Following his 
death in 1977, Macy was succeeded by three brothers – Nathan, Isidor and Oscar 
Strauss. The Strauss brothers soon entered into politics with relative ease, with Isidor 
appointed as an advisor for President Cleveland, Nathan becoming the president of 
the board of health in New York, and Oscar serving in Theodore Roosevelt’s cabinet 
(SJ 110 – 112). At about the same period but in the Midwestern part of the United 
States, another successful entrepreneur, George Pullman, was building a town for his 
factory workers in Illinois. Part of his dream was to create a utopian community of 
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“happy workers and a strike-free plant.” Everything that was needed for a livable 
community could be found: schools, shops, hotels, a library and even a church. 
However, in exchange for houses that were comparatively better and cheaper than 
others available to American workers during the 1880s, workers were subjected to a 
strict social discipline. For instance, they were barred from building their own 
churches and were required to behave and dress in a presentable manner in public 
spaces. “Company inspectors,” not policemen, would threaten misbehaving residents 
with fines (SJ 295 – 297). What could be ethically wrong with the Strauss brothers 
and George Pullman? In the former case, Walzer suggests that the market success of 
Macy’s was the main factor that helped realized the Strauss brothers’ political 
ambition. In the latter case, he suggests that Pullman was in effect establishing a 
private government where he could have absolute control over his workers (SJ 293 – 
294).  
We should not dismiss these 19th century cases as outdated for they are 
paradigmatic of contemporary relationships between political and property power. 
“Corruption” is the common expression that is often associated with the Strauss 
brothers’ form of political ascension. Although Walzer only suggests how capitalists 
are able to gain political power through commercial influence, it is not difficult to 
imagine the reverse where politicians are able to leverage their political clout in the 
market place for unethical ends. Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man is insightful to help 
us understand the complicity between politicians and capitalists in American society. 
His study of America as a “Welfare-through-Warfare State”55 is essentially a post-
Marxist critique on how the profit-making military industrial complex is capable of 
“reproducing” itself only if politicians and capitalists are able to establish a moral 
                                                
55 Herbert Marcuse, “Political Preface to Eros and Civilization” in Towards a Critical Theory of 
Society: Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, ed. Douglas Kellner (New York: Routledge, 2001), 99. 
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consensus among citizens that freedom is best achieved if citizens are willing fight in 
the far-flung regions where freedom is threatened.56 Whereas the territorial battle for 
American freedom was Vietnam in the 1960s, it appears to be Afghanistan in the 21st 
century. Whether the threat is rhetorical or real, citizens need to rely on politicians 
with the moral integrity to make the right decision—not the profitable decision. 
Likewise, capitalists with integrity are also needed in George Pullman’s form of 
private government. Although the idea of private government has its historical setting 
in the feudal system, where owners were able to exercise judicial and politic powers 
over the people who live on their lands, Walzer suggests that private governance is 
still prevalent “in the post-feudal economy” where “capitalist ownership still 
generates political power, if not in the market… then in the factory itself” (SJ 294). 
Capitalist ownership, if unregulated, is problematic because workers may not have the 
bargaining power to negotiate their wages, appropriate rest hours and medical 
compensations in dangerous works.  
Therefore, the state-community tension is not a simplistic tension between the 
rich and the poor but a complex story between the rich and powerful on the one side, 
and the poor or powerless on the other. The first step towards relieving this complex 
tension is the separation of money from politics so that capitalists and politicians are 
coerced to stay within the boundaries of their legitimate influence. But how would the 
separation look like in the United States?  How is the separation achieved? The 
answers are found in Walzer’s theory of complex equality.  
At its essential core, complex equality can be understood as a theory that seeks 
to reduce the dominance of a social good and the monopoly of those goods. A social 
good could be money, citizenship rights, healthcare, education, kinship and love, 
                                                
56 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (London: Sphere Books, 1968), see especially Chapter 2 
“The Closing of the Political Universe.”  
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divine grace and political power. In this section, I will limit my discussion of complex 
equality to within the spheres of two social goods: money and political power.  
In any society, there is always a diversity of social goods. However, within 
this diversity, Walzer argues that some goods may become dominant, such that it is 
possible for society to use them in a way “that isn’t limited by their intrinsic 
meanings” and therefore “command a wide range of other goods” (SJ 10 – 11). 
Money is a possible example of a dominant good in a society where money could be 
exchanged for a place in office, political power or religious authority. These 
exchanges may be acceptable in some cultures but are considered undesirable in 
American society. Money becomes monopolized when someone is able to exploit its 
dominance through various means of ownership and control, such as family 
reputation, political office and technical knowledge (SJ 11). For Walzer, political 
theorists who postulate principles of “simple equality” solely from the perspective of 
money as a medium of exchange have failed to recognize the subtle ways in which 
exploitations and inequalities occur in other spheres of social life. Therefore, an 
egalitarian society is not one that aims for a regime of simple equality where 
“everything is up for sale and every citizen has as much money as every other” (SJ 
14). Rather, it is one that is free from the root problem of dominance: 
 
The aim of political egalitarianism is a society free from domination. 
This is the lively hope named by the word equality… It is not a hope 
for the elimination of differences; we don’t all have to be the same or 
have the same amounts of the same things. Men and women are one 
another’s equals… when no one possesses or controls the means of 
domination… Equality as we have dreamed of it does not require the 
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repression of persons. We have to understand and control social goods; 
we do not have to stretch or shrink human beings (SJ xiii). 
 
Political egalitarianism, in Walzer’s view, is therefore best understood as a series of 
“spheres of justice,” with each sphere functioning as a set of distributive principles 
that controls the dominance of a particular social good. 
One might wonder if the meaning of equality is lost in such a radically 
pluralistic view of distributive theory. In other words, Walzer may have adequately 
defended an idea of what “justice” entails but failed to explain what “equality” means. 
It is impossible for me to cover the range of philosophical arguments for and against 
his notion of equality here. However, I will only examine his concession that a 
complex egalitarian society could still be “inegalitarian,” if we consider the 
possibility that a group of outstanding individuals could play according to the rules of 
complex equality and yet reign in every sphere (SJ 20). While this could be a defeat 
for complex equality, Walzer says that this would also “suggest in the strongest way 
that a society of equals was not a lively possibility.” And it would also be doubtful 
“that any egalitarian argument could survive in the face of such evidence” (SJ 20).  
David Miller takes Walzer’s point further and suggests that the goal of 
complex equality is not so much to prevent a few outstanding individuals from 
outranking all other individuals. Rather the goal is to prevent society from splitting up 
into two subsets such that all the members of one subset consistently outrank all the 
members of the other.57 Miller ventures to say that the existence of two subsets could 
be an actual situation in the United States where members of the upper class “score 
highly enough in most spheres for us to judge that they do indeed form a separate and 
                                                
57 David Miller, “Complex Equality,” in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, eds. David Miller and 
Michael Walzer (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 210. 
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superior class.”58 Seen from Miller’s view, complex equality is a progressive idea that 
could alleviate this systemic inequality, even if the definition of “equality” is slightly 
indeterminate. Perhaps it is also useful to consider Miller’s point that simple 
egalitarians have not got an accurate theory of equality either, since their theories 
generally include a clause that it is necessary to “sacrifice equality to some extent in 
order to promote rival values such as individual choice or social utility.” To defend 
this clause, simple egalitarians then try to make “these trade-offs less acute” with 
ideas similar to the Rawlsian difference principle of maximizing the advantages of the 
worst-off groups in society. Consequently, their ideas may explain what equality 
ought to mean in practice but do not explain what equality is in theory.59  
With my above outline of complex equality, the state-community tension can 
be more accurately understood as a consequence of: 1) a lack of state coercion in the 
sphere of money; and 2) a lack of checks and balances in the sphere of political 
power. The lack of state regulation in the sphere of money allows money to become a 
dominant good outside its sphere. Consequently, capitalists like Pullman are able to 
behave like political leaders in the market place; or, like the Strauss brothers, they 
become political leaders. The lack of regulation in the sphere of money is reinforced 
by the lack of checks and balances in the sphere of political power. This allows 
capitalists to influence government decisions in undemocratic ways.  
To relieve the state-community tension, Walzer proposes a series of principles 
that are founded on the Bill of Rights, which is a set of amendments made to the 
United States Constitution during the late 18th century (SJ 100). These amendments 
are reformulated into a list of “blocked exchanges” that serve to restrain the 
dominance of money in other spheres. The list includes prohibitions such as the 
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impermissibility of money to purchase political power, office holdings, basic welfare 
services like police protection, exemptions from military service, prizes and honors, 
divine grace and so forth (SJ 100 – 103). A similar list is mentioned in the sphere of 
political power, where he introduces a series of “blocked uses of power” (SJ 282 – 
284) that collectively serves to limit the powers of politicians, such as the 
impermissibility of government officials to enslave or repress others, discriminate 
against racial, ethnic or religious groups, corrupt the system of criminal justice, 
confiscate private property, control the religious life of citizens, regulate the freedom 
of expression and so forth (SJ 282 – 284). Based on the rules of block exchanges and 
blocked uses of power, he further suggests a few practical solutions that can help to 
separate money from politics in American society, such as a call for stronger 
democratic institutions within the government (SJ 303 – 304), stronger government 
support for trade unions (SJ 119 – 121) and stricter laws in regulating the activities of 
firms and factories in the area of criminal justice, welfare protection, environmental 
use and so on (SJ 302).  
Although the rules of blocked exchanges and blocked uses of power are 
morally and politically sound, one might argue that they are not products of Walzer’s 
interpretation of America’s moral and political culture but products of his left-wing 
liberal values. This is a view that has been strongly suggested by Dworkin in his 
review of Spheres of Justice. I will consider his view in detail for the rest of this 
section, since part of my aim in this chapter is to defend the coherence of Walzer’s 
interpretation. In his review, Dworkin argues that the fact that “people disagree about 
social meanings… shows that there is no shared meaning to disagree about.” Walzer 
is therefore not interpreting a set of existing social meanings per se but relying on a 
“hidden assumption” that a “pre-established” or an ideal sphere exists for every social 
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good. Walzer’s presupposition of ideal spheres explains his demand for a full national 
healthcare system according to the principle of need rather than a mixed system that 
considers the principle of free exchange for certain areas of medical care.60 By 
questioning the existence of shared meanings, Dworkin has delivered a knock down 
argument against Walzer’s theory of interpretation, since on that theory interpretation 
presupposes a thick moral tradition as the basis for social criticism.  
There are two ways to respond to Dworkin. One (which I have explained in 
Chapter One) is to take the view that although people disagree about social meanings, 
they also disagree within a moral foundation that has been agreed by everyone. The 
Bill of Rights, which informs Walzer’s formulation of blocked exchanges and 
blocked uses of power, is an example of a common moral foundation for America’s 
democratic culture. Of course, Dworkin might argue that, historically speaking, the 
Bill of Rights was the product of a particular interpretation—that of the anti-
Federalists championed by Thomas Jefferson. Hence, once again, Walzer might find 
himself conceptually trapped, either on a slippery bed of indeterminate moral values 
or within a rigid set of preconceived moral ideas. This possible criticism by Dworkin 
leads me to my second response, which is a nuanced view that Walzer’s moral 
foundation in Spheres of Justice is neither slippery nor rigid but inherently open and 
subject to change.61 Although the open texture of America’s moral foundation means 
that Walzer’s interpretation can never provide a fixed and objective answer, the crux 
of the matter is less about getting the best interpretation than about creating a 
democratic system that can accommodate subjective discourses of morality in an open 
and unbiased manner.  
                                                
60 Ronald Dworkin, “To Each His Own,” web version.   
61 “But how can we recognize better and worse interpretations of moral standards? ... I have already 
suggested my own answer, or nonanswer, to such questions: [social critics] set the terms of moral 
argument, and the argument has no end. It has only temporary stopping points, moments of judgment” 
(ISC 49). 
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Walzer does not discuss the open texture of interpretation in Spheres of 
Justice. Nevertheless, he does offer a sustained treatment on the importance of an 
ideal democratic institution that can reduce the errors of interpretation: 
 
Ideally, the citizen who makes the most persuasive argument—that is, 
the argument that actually persuades the largest number of citizens—
gets his way. But he can’t use force, or pull rank, or distribute money; 
he must talk about the issues at hand. And all the other citizens must 
talk, too, or at least have a chance to talk. It is not only the 
inclusiveness, however, that makes for democratic government. 
Equally important is what we might call the rule of reasons. Citizens 
come into the forum with nothing but their arguments. All non-
political goods have to be deposited outside: weapons and wallets, 
titles and degrees (SJ 304).  
 
Walzer, of course, does not expect such an idealistic picture of democracy to take 
place in reality. But what is outstanding about this passage is not only his vividness in 
capturing the importance of an unhindered democracy but also a clear moral 
perspective that should reject the unsophisticated opinion that he is an unprincipled 
conventionalist or communitarian, for it clearly upholds the inalienable rights of 
individuals: “The argument for the stronger forms of participation is an argument for 
complex equality… [and] democracy requires equal rights” (SJ 308 – 309). No doubt, 
the decisions that arise from a democratic discourse may reflect “a multitude of 
compromises” (SJ 304); however, political power is at least distributed equally among 
every citizen and not in a lopsided manner that favors the rich and the powerful. 
Notwithstanding the possibility that moral discourses in an ideal democracy may 
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ultimately be shaped by the masters of political rhetoric (in this case, education could 
be a dominant good and not money or political power), it is in Walzer’s view the most 
plausible system for communities to shape their own interpretation of what complex 
equality means and how social justice is best achieved.  
I have tried to demonstrate the practical dimension of Spheres of Justice by 
discussing how an unjustifiable tension between the state, community and the market 
place is best relieved through the idea of complex equality. Complex equality 
demands that laws (within the United States) are clear about the distinction between 
the principles of free exchange and the rules of politics, so that capitalists and 
politicians are coerced to stay within the bounds of their respective professions. 
Understanding what these laws, principles and rules could mean would require an 
accurate interpretation of America’s political culture. Ideally, Walzer would have 
preferred to interpret within what Habermas calls an “ideal speech situation,” where 
citizens are able to meaningfully and freely participate in an open conversation on 
morality, without coercion or manipulation. But whereas Habermas’s ideal 
conversation presumes that participants will collectively produce a final and definitive 
answer62, Walzer’s ideal democracy assumes an actual conversation with no finite 
ends: “In democratic politics, all destinations are temporary” (SJ 310). The 
indeterminacy of moral life does not imply an unprincipled political life; hence 
Walzer’s heavy reliance on history63 and founding documents like the Constitution, 
Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights to advance his criticism of social 
injustice in American politics.  
                                                
62 This is a view taken from Walzer’s essay, “A Critique of Philosophical Conversation,” where he says 
that Habermas “apparently believes that conversation subject to the universalization constraint will 
produce among the speakers… an endogenous change of preferences… such that preferences, tastes, 
values, ideals… be unified and no longer conflict. But what possible reason do we have for joining in 
this belief” (TP 28)? 
63 I will further discuss Walzer’s reliance on History as a source of moral guidance in Chapter 3.  
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Can a parallel analysis be made for Just and Unjust Wars? In other words, is it 
possible to present a similar case on how Walzer resolves tensions in international 
politics by accurately interpreting the laws and conventions of international society? 
This is an important question since this thesis rests on a premise that Just and Unjust 
Wars and Spheres of Justice are related by a Walzerian disposition to relieve state-
community tensions in the world of politics. My short answer is yes and to defend this 
answer, I will now turn my attention to radical tensions in Just and Unjust Wars.  
 
Resolving Radical Tensions in Just and Unjust Wars 
 
I consider a radical state-community tension as not only unjustifiable in the everyday 
sense, where a government has failed to protect the shared values of its community, 
but also one in which a government has violated minimum standards of human rights 
in its conduct towards its citizens. This violation is what distinguishes a radical 
tension from an everyday one. Although one may contend that a radical tension is 
strictly speaking a domestic issue, I consider it an “international” one for the main 
reason that it usually involves intervention by the international community. In Just 
and Unjust Wars, exercising casuistry is Walzer’s way of resolving radical tensions. 
As I earlier explained, casuistry involves interpreting the circumstances surrounding a 
particular tension as well as relevant principles in international law and morality, 
before proposing a solution to relieve the tension.64  
In Just and Unjust Wars, many of the conflicts that match my description of a 
radical state-community tension are concentrated in Chapter Six concerning Walzer’s 
revisionist perspective of the legalist paradigm. The legalist paradigm must be revised 
                                                
64 It is useful to note that mistakes are possible in casuistry. There are right and wrong ways of 
relieving the tension. From the standpoint of common morality, a strategy that allowed considerations 
of expediency to override those of morality in the circumstances at hand might be defective. 
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for the main reason that it is possible for governments to violate the principle of self-
determination within state boundaries yet enjoy immunity from the international 
principle of non-interference. These violations are usually found in cases of 
secessions, civil wars and acts “that shock the moral conscience of mankind” (JUJW 
107). To demonstrate Walzer’s casuistry in mitigating these violations, I will study 
his revisionist perspective in tandem with his arguments in “Albert Camus’s Algerian 
War,” a 1984 essay in Dissent that was later incorporated in The Company of Critics.  
The Algerian War is unlike the different cases of violation studied in Chapter 
Six of Just and Unjust Wars because the war can be interpreted in two ways: a 
legitimate nationalist war by the Algerian political community or a civil war between 
two legitimate political communities: Algiers and the colonial pied noirs that co-
existed with the natives for close to a hundred years. What is the best solution for two 
different wars operating within the same space and time? In principle, there are two 
solutions. One solution is a military intervention by foreign powers on behalf of an 
Algerian community against an illegitimate French colonial government. Another 
possibility is for foreigners to simply respect the principle of non-intervention, so as 
to ensure fairness to both legitimate parties in the civil war, and at a more 
fundamental level, allow citizens on both sides to exercise their rightful claims to the 
principle of self-determination. Historically speaking, the international community 
took the latter approach. The carnage between the two sides resulted in an estimated 
death toll of 500,000 civilians, militants and soldiers, and an eventual exodus of more 
than a million pied noir refugees to France.65 In The Company of Critics, Walzer 
suggests that a bi-national partition in Algeria would have been the most practical and 
feasible peace agreement.  
                                                
65 Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830 – 2000: A Short History (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 
2001), 111.  
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In this section, I am less interested in the technical feasibility of the partition 
than in the moral justification of partition itself. In my view, this moral justification is 
primarily centered on the principle of self-determination. To understand this principle, 
it is necessary for me to briefly consider Walzer’s revisionist perspective of the 
legalist paradigm. For it is through the revised version of the legalist paradigm that it 
becomes clearer for us to understand the principle of self-determination as well as the 
different wars operating in Algeria from 1952 to 1964.  
A key principle in the unrevised version of the legalist paradigm is the 
principle of non-interference. This principle is clearly expressed in the first 
proposition of the legalist paradigm: “In the absence of [a] universal state, men and 
women are protected and their interests represented only by their own governments. 
Though states are founded for the sake of life and liberty, they cannot be challenged 
in the name of life and liberty by any other states. Hence the principle of non-
intervention” (JUJW 61). Because of the carnage and grimness of war, war must be 
the last resort to peace, and peace is best secured by the principle of non-intervention. 
States cannot attack other states for reasons other than that of self-defense. Violating 
the principle of non-interference—even for the sake of life and liberty—is tantamount 
to the criminal act of aggression, which provides the justification for the victim state 
or international society to militarily thwart off the aggressor (JUJW 62).  
But there is another principle at work in international politics: the principle of 
self-determination. In liberal theory, self-determination is an important concept that, 
at its fundamental level, is concerned with the individual’s potential to be an 
autonomous agent in his or her life choices without coercion, influence or intervention 
by other agents or institutions. The individualism of self-determination is given a 
more communal form in a short essay by John Stuart Mill, titled “A Few Words on 
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Non-Intervention.”66 There, Mill argues that states should be regarded as self-
determining communities even if their internal political arrangements are illiberal 
(JUJW 87).  Walzer agrees with Mill that the state is the best institution for citizens to 
learn, develop and exercise their right of self-determination. Like Mill, Walzer argues 
that even in authoritarian regimes, it is in the best interest of the community to rely on 
themselves to orchestrate reforms and revolutions because any foreign intervention 
would jeopardize their learning chances in the school of self-determination.  “It is not 
true… that intervention is justified whenever revolution is; for revolutionary activity 
is an exercise in self-determination, while foreign interference denies to a people 
those political capacities that only such exercise can bring” (JUJW 89). The Millian 
principle of self-determination is for Walzer a strong justification for the principle of 
non-intervention.  
 However, Walzer (concurring with Mill) also says that there are times when it 
is not immediately clear if a community is in fact self-determining or if the principle 
of non-intervention is still relevant (JUJW 91). Walzer offers the following three 
scenarios:  
 
1) When a community is engaged in a secessionist movement or 
national liberation; the principle of non-interference is suspended since 
a foreign power “is already interfering in the ‘domestic affairs,’ that is, 
in the self-determinations of … [the] community” (JUJW 93).  
 
2) When a foreign army has already intervened on behalf of one party 
in a civil war and therefore tilts the chances of self-determination in 
favor of that particular party; the principle of non-interference is 
                                                
66 John Stuart Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” Dissertations and discussions: political, 
philosophical, and historical, (New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1973).  
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suspended so that foreign powers can fight on behalf of the 
disadvantaged party as a form of counter-intervention— “holding the 
circle, preserving the balance, [and] restoring some degree of integrity 
to the local struggle” (JUJW 97). 
 
3) When a government is engaged in an extreme violation of human 
rights such that it is preposterous for moralists to think in terms of non-
intervention, for cases such as massacre of enslavement.  
 
In light of the above scenarios, a “revisionist perspective” of the legalist paradigm is 
required since the moral basis of a just war that proceeds from the idea of self-defense 
is no longer relevant. These scenarios are also the “rules of disregard” (JUJW 86) in 
Walzer’s just war theory; the rules set the criteria on when states can militarily 
intervene into other states for reasons other than self-defense.  
Walzer’s revisionist perspective should suffice as a response to scholars like 
Wasserstrom, Doppelt, Beitz and Luban. As mentioned in Chapter One, these scholars 
share a common view that Just and Unjust Wars is statist in character and fails to pay 
enough attention to the rights of individuals despite the modifications made to the 
legalist paradigm. Walzer, in his reply in “The Moral Standing of States,” disagrees, 
observing that in retrospect he finds that his revisionist perspective is actually “too 
permissive with regard to secessionist movements and foreign support for such 
movements” (TP 220). Towards the end of his essay, he advances a series of 
arguments for why an overly permissive position on military intervention is often 
counter-productive in practice. I agree with Walzer’s overall reply, but the 
fundamental question is not whether he is too permissive or too restrictive in applying 
the rules of disregard but whether the rules themselves are morally coherent. From the 
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standpoint of coherence, Walzer’s rules of disregard are—contrary to Wasserstrom, 
Doppelt, Beitz and Luban—certainly not statist in character but in fact offer a sharper 
focus on the importance of the community and the individual. Walzer may be strict in 
his application of the rules but the strict application does not undermine the fact that 
the rules themselves are designed to achieve coherence among the foundational ideas 
of authority, rights and common life. In Walzer’s own words, the rules are designed to 
“uphold the values of individual life and communal liberty of which [state] 
sovereignty itself is merely an expression” (JUJW 108).  
But it is noteworthy that the rules of disregard are developed separately with 
case studies specifically chosen to illuminate the rules one at a time: a Hungarian 
secessionist war against the Hapsburg Empire (JUJW 91 – 95); a Vietnamese civil 
war that eventually became “an American war, fought for American purposes, in 
someone else’s country” (JUJW 101); and a Pakistani government that ordered the 
army to massacre its own Bengali people (JUJW 105). Each of the cases provides a 
cut-and-dried account on when it is permissible for international society to intervene 
or otherwise. But what if it is unclear whether a government is fighting a secessionist 
war or a civil war, or both types of wars at the same time? The anti-establishment 
wars waged by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Hamas in the Occupied Territories and 
the FLN (National Liberation Front) in Algeria illustrate these ambiguities. Should 
the international community intervene to aid in a secessionist war or restrain itself 
from engaging in a civil war? What would be a reasonable solution to these conflicts? 
Is Walzer’s modified version of the legalist paradigm still useful? To answer these 
questions, I will turn my attention to “Albert Camus’s Algerian War” in The 
Company of Critics to see how we can evaluate the morality of that war within the 
framework of the revised legalist paradigm.  
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I’ve deliberately chosen this essay as a way to consider Said’s view that the 
strong degree of historical parallelism between the Algerian War and the current 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict suggest that the moral arguments in “Albert Camus’s 
Algerian War” are not based on a rigorous interpretative analysis but proceed from a 
tacit support for the Jewish community in Israel, and hence the pied noir community 
in Algeria. Walzer’s “unstated thesis,” Said argues, “is that the one hundred and thirty 
years of Algerian enslavement and consequent demands for Algerian liberation were 
somehow less of a moral cause than that of Camus’s community of French settler-
colonists.”67 In a review of the subsequent heated letter exchanges between Said and 
Walzer, William D. Hart argues that “Camus is to the Algerian liberation struggle 
what Walzer is to the Palestinian struggle for national liberation—a smooth-talking 
apologist for settler-colonialism.” 68 This perhaps explains Walzer’s choice for a bi-
national partition and not the recognition of full independence, as the rest of the world 
did during the period of decolonization and in fact what De Gaulle’s government did 
in July 1962. It also explains Said’s unsympathetic criticism of Walzer’s worldview.  
Although one can argue that Walzer’s commitments to Israel have influenced 
his judgments, I argue that those claims by Said and Hart are exaggerated. A close 
study of various texts scattered across Just and Unjust Wars, Arguing about War, The 
Company of Critics and Thick and Thin will reveal a degree of moral clarity in his 
position on the Algerian case. Walzer is not the apologist that Said makes him out to 
be. On the contrary, he advances a solution that is reasonable and morally sound, 
without abandoning the foundational ideas of authority, rights and common life 
presupposed in the revised version of the legalist paradigm.  
                                                
67 Said, “Michael Walzer’s Exodus and Revolution,” 174. 
68 See William D. Hart, “Whose exodus, which interpretation?” in Edward Said and the Religious 
Effects of Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 186. 
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As I earlier suggest and will now elaborate, the Algerian War was a conflict in 
which two just wars were operating at the same time.  On one level, the War was a 
nationalist revolution by the Algiers in response to the many years of French 
colonialism and racial discrimination. On another level, it was a fight for political 
legitimacy between two “Algerian nations” (CC 145), each with equal and rightful 
claims to territorial integrity and political sovereignty. After all, close to 79 percent of 
the pied noirs were born on Algerian soil by 1954. “Whatever their origins, they 
considered themselves part of an ‘Algerian France’; the ‘French of France’ were 
perceived as compatriots of a different sort.”69 While the pied noirs were not 
irreproachable during the days of colonialism, it would have been equally unjust for 
the Algiers to force them back to France, “for men and women don’t lose their rights 
even if they [were] historically in the wrong” (CC 145).    
Therefore, on both levels, the wars were just: whether it was a war for 
independence from the perspective of the Algerians or a war for political legitimacy 
from the pied noir community. One could also make the argument that there were two 
unjust wars operating in tandem with the two just wars: a politics of terrorism by the 
FLN in its wanton killing of innocent French civilians and a similar response by the 
OAS (Organisation armée secrète) in its counter-terrorist tactics. In light of the War’s 
moral complexity, what kind of moral judgments can we make? Or more specifically, 
how do we evaluate the morality of partition as a solution?  
In “Albert Camus’s Algerian War,” Walzer’s moral judgment is primarily 
developed through the eyes of Camus, a French intellectual who recognized the 
injustice of French colonialism but nonetheless supported the pied noirs on the 
grounds of a shared brotherhood with fellow citizens. For Walzer, Camus’s loyalty 
                                                
69 Stora, Algeria: A Short History, 8. 
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with the pied noirs makes him a better social critic than Jean-Paul Sarte and Simone 
de Beauvoir. While equally critical of French colonialism, Walzer says that Sarte and 
Beauvoir were far too detached and therefore incapable of unpacking the moral 
complexities of the conflict. Their simplistic view of the War and unsympathetic 
disposition to the pied noir community led them to “an ideologically flattened 
world—The FLN represented liberation, the French were fascists” (CC 142, 
paraphrased). On the other hand, Camus’s complex “crime of love” is more nuanced: 
“I believe in justice, but I will defend my mother before justice… if anyone still 
thinks heroically that one’s brother must die rather than one’s principles, I shall go no 
further than to admire him from a distance. I am not of his stamp,” Walzer quotes 
Camus approvingly (CC 145). While I admire Camus’s loyalty to France, I find 
Walzer’s moral position qua Camus unpersuasive. How would Camus “defend” his 
mother if she had committed murder? On the account that Walzer has painted a rather 
emotive account of Camus’s Algerian War, Said is right to criticize him for an 
ungrounded, even biased, moral judgment that betrays the values that he upholds in 
Just and Unjust Wars. But before we quickly dismiss Walzer’s position on the 
Algerian War as one that is clouded by sentiments, it is important to note that he has 
made several comments about the War in other works, of which the most important 
one is an analytical, systematic and persuasive essay (in comparison to “Albert 
Camus’s Algerian War”) on a conflict that is similar to the Algerian War—the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.   
Indeed, my presentation of the four wars in Algeria is modeled after Walzer’s 
account in “The Four Wars of Israel/ Palestine.” I want to suggest that Algeria is 
Walzer’s intellectual proxy for understanding the ongoing conflict in Israel and 
Palestine. But more importantly, I want to enrich our understanding of Walzer’s 
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interpretative approach towards international conflicts like the Algerian War and the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, Walzer argues that there are 
four wars occurring at the same time: 
 
1) An unjust war against Israel by two terrorist organizations, Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad, against Jewish settlers in West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip as well as Israeli towns near the Green Line border.  
 
2) A Palestinian just war for an independent state in West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, which has been unjustly occupied by Jewish settlers 
since the 1967 Six-Day war.  
 
3) An Israeli just war for security against Palestinian terrorism. 
 
4) An Israeli unjust war for Greater Israel by occupying West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip.  
 
Clearly, there is a resemblance between the four wars of the Israeli-Palestinian case 
and the four wars of the Algerian case.70 With the exception that the pied noirs could 
at least return to France whereas the Jews have nowhere else but Israel, a series of 
parallels can be drawn: Hamas is to Palestine what the FLN was to Algeria; the 
Palestinian just cause for independence is similar to what the Algiers were fighting 
for; the Israeli government’s response to terrorism is similar to the French 
government’s commitment to protect the pied noirs in Algeria; the right-wing 
                                                
70 In fact, Walzer himself also draws a series of parallels between the Israeli-Palestinian case and the 
Algerian case, such as the similar goals of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the FLN, or the similar 
associations between Yasir Arafat’s tactical relationship with the terrorists and the Algerian 
government’s one with the FLN (AW 114, 115 and 124).  
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opinions among Israeli politicians for Greater Israel is similar to the minority view 
among French politicians who wanted to retain control of Algeria.  
The most important parallel for our discussion is Walzer’s solutions to both 
conflicts, since they are useful to help us evaluate the coherence of his moral 
judgment in international politics.  His solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is 
that both sides must display commitment to stop the two unjust wars—“Palestinians 
must renounce terrorism; Israelis must renounce occupation” (AW 126)—before a 
peace plan can be made to fulfill the goals of the two just wars, which in essence is 
the establishment of two states with some mutually agreed modifications to the Green 
Line, presumably a return to the pre-1967 border. Notwithstanding the fact that a 
“Green Line” did not exist in Algeria then, Walzer probably has something similar in 
mind. Short of an exodus of a million pied noirs, a partition would have been the best 
peace settlement. 
One should not understand partition as Walzer’s moral blindness to the way 
Algeria was unjustly occupied to begin with; he does recognize the injustice of 
colonialism. Rather it should be seen as his solution of last resort, which he explains 
in Thick and Thin: 
 
Except… unless… Conquest and oppression are not merely abstract 
crimes; they have consequences in the real world: the mixing up of 
peoples, the creation of new and heterogeneous populations… Suppose 
that French colonists had come (by 1950, say) to outnumber the Arabs 
and Berbers of Algeria: would the right of “Algerian” self-
determination reside with the French majority? These are doubly hard 
questions; they are painful and they are difficult. The world changes, 
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not necessarily in morally justifiable ways; and rights can be lost or, at 
least, diminished through no fault of the losers (TT 71). 
 
Walzer deliberately inserts the conjunctions “except” and “unless” to signify the 
understanding that international conflicts are not always best resolved by the “favored 
principles” of “state sovereignty and legal uniformity” (CC 147). Radical tensions are 
sometimes best relieved by “the nearest possible arrangement to whatever was ex ante 
just,” taking into account the lives of immigrants, colonists and children, “who are not 
themselves the authors of the conquest or the oppression” (TT 71 – 72). The ex ante 
approach towards international conflicts is similar to Walzer’s arguments of a 
supreme emergency. It is a practical and utilitarian perspective of resolving radical 
conflicts in the best possible manner but only as a last resort when all other means for 
peace settlement are exhausted.  
In discussing the Algerian War, I have tried to argue that Walzer, on matters 
of resolving radical tensions in international politics, has a clear moral vision that is 
evidently displayed throughout Just and Unjust Wars, Arguing about War, Thick and 
Thin and The Company of Critics. This vision has a theoretical and practical 
dimension. The theoretical dimension is evident in his arguments for a revisionist 
perspective of the legalist paradigm which in its essence is based on the principle of 
self-determination. It is also evident in his inquiry of the four wars in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, which, because of their theoretical and paradigmatic forms, 
“don’t appear separately in the ‘real world’” (AW 114). The practical dimension is 
reflected in his solutions for real world conflicts which in my view are measured, 
prudent and reasonable. More importantly, they are made with an honest admission 
that the solutions are sometimes unable to remedy the historical injustice of radical 
tensions. His admission does not indicate incoherence in his interpretation of 
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morality; it indicates that the practice of justice does not always proceed from the 
theory of justice, because of contingencies that are beyond the scope of moral theory.  
Part of the reason why I dedicated a substantial amount of analytical inquiry 
into the Algerian War is to also acknowledge Said’s view that Walzer’s defense of the 
pied noir community in the Algerian War is possibly (though not with certainty) a 
strategy for him to defend the Jewish community in Israel and Palestine. But a 
broader aim is to bring some balance to Said’s criticism. To begin with, I agree with 
Said that Walzer’s moral judgment in “Albert Camsus’s Algerian War” is equivocal. 
It is one thing to argue for partition as a last resort in Thick and Thin but quite another 
to valiantly defend an unjust community in ways that are theoretically weak: 
sentiments, loyalty and love. I believe Walzer has both views in mind in his essay, but 
his emphasis on the latter has the effect of obscuring his deontological interpretation 
of the War. Consequently, it is hard to see where sentiments end and morality begins 
in his moral judgment. 
 But Said is wrong to criticize Walzer for practicing a “double standard”71 in 
his interpretation of politics and morality, such as praising Camus’s support for the 
pied noirs but yet unwilling to consider the moral legitimacy of the FLN 
intellectuals.72 I believe Walzer does acknowledge the just cause of the FLN; what he 
disapproves is their unjust means of achieving their cause. “Certainly, there are 
historical moments when armed struggle is necessary for the sake of human freedom. 
But if dignity and self-respect are to be the outcomes of that struggle, it cannot consist 
of terrorist attacks upon children… The mark of a revolutionary struggle against 
oppression, however, is not this incapacitating rage and random violence, but restraint 
and self-control” (JUJW 205). Walzer’s “double standard” can perhaps be clarified by 
                                                
71 Said, “Michael Walzer’s Exodus and Revolution,” 175. 
72 It is noteworthy that Said does not refer to the FLN as terrorists, which Walzer does in Just and 
Unjust Wars.   
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the view that there are two moral doctrines operating at the same time in any war, jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello. Even though the FLN cause is a noble one, it must be 
fought with a respect for the distinction between combatants and ordinary citizens.  
Said’s charge of Walzer’s “double standard” does not only apply to the 
Algerian War but also to his overall intellectual career. For instance, he says that his 
double standard is reflected in his defense of “liberalism, independence, freedom from 
oppression” in Just and Unjust Wars on the one hand, and yet on the other hand, in 
his 1972 essay, “Nationalism, Internationalism, and the Jews,” suggests that 
marginalized groups (presumably Palestinians) should be “helped to leave” if their 
fight for national liberation fails.73 However, this double standard can be clarified 
within a recurring theme that I have tried to suggest in this chapter, which is the need 
to separate the theory and practice of justice in Walzer’s overall political thought. As 
Walzer himself says, in his response to Said, helping people to leave may be the only 
feasible solution in extreme cases—the nearest possible arrangement to whatever was 
ex ante just—but it is something that he defends “only as a last resort, the sad 
aftermath of, never a replacement for, national liberation.”74 Hence, Walzer’s political 
thought is much more nuanced than how Said has set him up to be. He may be 
flexible in moral practice but this does mean that he is unprincipled in his 




To recapitulate the main arguments of this chapter, I have tried to demonstrate a 
practical relationship between Spheres of Justice and Just and Unjust Wars by 
                                                
73 Said, “Michael Walzer’s Exodus and Revolution,” 173. 
74 Walzer’s quote is found in Hart, “Whose exodus, which interpretation?”, p. 189 
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arguing that both books share a similar discourse in politics and morality, which is the 
existence of a state-community tension in the world of politics. To understand this 
tension in greater detail, I explained it in terms of an everyday tension within 
America’s capitalist liberal democracy and a radical tension within the four wars of 
the Algerian conflict. Relieving the tensions in practical ways without abandoning the 
theoretical ideas of political authority, common life and individual rights discussed in 
Chapter One, is my way of defending a consistent thread that runs through the 
arguments of Spheres of Justice and Just and Unjust Wars.  
In an everyday tension, it is arguably easier for Walzer to harmonize the 
contesting interests of state, community and individual in ways that are reasonable 
and just. For instance, his lists of blocked exchanges and blocked uses of power, 
which set limits on what money can buy and what power can do, are grounded in an 
elaborate yet coherent theory of complex equality. His theory presupposes a shared 
moral understanding among American citizens, which is in turn based upon founding 
documents like the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights.  
In a radical tension, it is much more difficult to harmonize the conflicting 
interests of state, community and individual for the main reason that there usually isn't 
a single political authority to begin with, or even a shared understanding between 
state and community: what was considered a nationalist liberation war from the eyes 
of the Algiers was also a war for political legitimacy from the eyes of the pied noirs. 
Consequently, despite a coherent account of a just war theory that is grounded within 
a deontological moral foundation, Walzer’s practical solution of a bi-national partition 
for the Algerian War may across as ad-hoc, as Said suggests.   
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 In explaining Walzer’s interpretation of everyday and radical tensions, I tried 
to maintain a sense of parallelism in my presentation. My intention was to let the 
presentation itself reveal a consistent theme in Spheres of Justice and Just and Unjust 
Wars. Just as Walzer’s practical recommendations for stronger unions and stricter 
government regulations in Spheres of Justice are centered on a theory of complex 
equality, so in Just and Unjust Wars the practical considerations of interventions and 
partitions are based on the principles of non-intervention and self-determination. Just 
as Dworkin criticizes Walzer’s interpretation of American politics as one that 
proceeds from a left-wing liberal disposition, so does Said who criticizes his 
interpretation of the Algerian War as one that proceeds from a tacit support for Israel. 
However, as I have tried to argue, Walzer’s interpretation is not unprincipled for they 
are grounded in the core ideas of political authority, common life and individual 
rights. I believe that these core ideas have been relatively self-evident through the 
way I emphasize the importance of citizenship rights in Spheres of Justice and human 
rights in Just and Unjust Wars, as well as the importance of community as a basis for 
shared understandings in Spheres of Justice or as a basis for collective self-
determination in Just and Unjust Wars.  
The importance of political authority has perhaps been under emphasized in 
this chapter, given the way I framed the government as one of corrupt politicians in 
Spheres of Justice or antagonistic rulers in Just and Unjust Wars. But it is noteworthy 
that the government is an important entity for political justice in Walzer’s writings. In 
fact, the state and community are always tied to each other—one cannot do without 
the other. The state needs the community for its legitimacy. In return, the state 
provides the community with public goods by which the community cannot provide 
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for their members, such as security and welfare.75 In this chapter, I also explained that 
the state performs an important role as the “visible hand” in regulating the corrosive 
effects of market capitalism. In contrast to emerging theories of cosmopolitanism, 
Walzer believes that the government continues to play an important role in combating 
the global injustice of the day. Although distributive patterns at the global level can 
never be fully egalitarian, “what most of the world’s poor most need are better states” 
and not anti-state politics (PP 138). Walzer’s global society is therefore neither a 
stateless system (as Wasserstrom, Doppelt, Beitz and Luban prefer) in which 
cosmopolitan citizens are free to roam around the globe to enjoy public goods, nor a 
world state in which complex equality can be extended all the way up to the global 
level, since it is unlikely that a global state can exist to match up with the “common 
life” of a global community, or provide the right interpretation of social goods for 
every community. Neither is Walzer’s global society a “statist” one. Rather it is one 
that takes into account radical tensions in international politics. Within the revised 
version of the legalist paradigm, there is room for the shifting of state and communal 
boundaries through secessions so that radical tensions are relieved and states can 
match up with the needs of the community.  
Walzer’s contribution to political theory lies in the brilliant way he 
harmonizes state, community and individual, not by imagining a utopian world but by 
interpreting the moral landscapes of an actual imperfect world. The weight that 
Walzer gives to each element is based on the judgment of circumstances in particular 
cases. Practical relevance precedes philosophical soundness in Walzer’s commitment 
to stand in the imperfect world. His attempt is marred by occasional incoherence, such 
as his sentimental defense of Camus or utilitarian account of emergency ethics. But in 
                                                
75 I’ve discussed this in Chapter 1, concerning the politics of healthcare in the sphere of welfare.  
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my view, Walzer’s response must be appreciated from the standpoint of an imperfect 
world, not a utopian one. The harmony of state, community and individual may not be 
perfect but it at least demonstrates a vivid and valiant response to the shifting 
contingencies of moral dilemmas.   
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Chapter 3 
Objectivity and Inter-Subjectivity 
 
So far, my aim has been to correct the view that Walzer is an inconsistent theorist 
who defends moral universalism in Just and Unjust Wars but subsequently rejects it 
in favor of moral relativism in Spheres of Justice. I have argued that he has a 
reasonably consistent account of justice that involves two types of tension: 1) a 
conceptual tension between the core ideas of his political thought (authority, common 
life and rights); and 2) a practical tension between the corresponding elements of his 
core ideas (state, community and individual). I also argued that Walzer is more 
interested in resolving practical tensions in the world of politics than conceptual 
tensions in political theory. I sought to demonstrate in Chapter Two how his method 
of resolving tensions is essentially interpretative in character, one that is based on the 
judgment of circumstances and interpretation of moral principles and applications of 
these principles.  
 I have not yet discussed the charge of inconsistency. I found it helpful to put 
that discussion aside to show the coherence of Walzer’s political thought by looking 
at the relevant texts. In this chapter, I want to address that charge by returning to my 
conceptual study in Chapter One to further explore the idea of rights. In particular, I 
want to investigate the methodological foundation of Walzer’s understanding of rights 
with the following question. Is his understanding based on philosophical reasoning or 
on the beliefs of different moral communities? By answering this question, I aim to 
not only reconcile moral universalism and moral particularism but also shed further 
light on the relationship between Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice. But 
before I proceed with my answer and arguments, let me further explain the context of 
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the alleged inconsistency between the universalism and particularism of Walzer’s 
political thought.  
Because of the practical trajectory of Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of 
Justice, Walzer does not substantially explain the foundation of his political thought. 
In fact, in Just and Unjust Wars, he explicitly avoids such metaphysical issues by 
acknowledging that the “the substructure of the ethical world is a matter of deep and 
apparently unending controversy” and he is “by no means sure what the foundations 
are” (JUJW xxiii). Walzer, of course, is fully aware of his moral philosophy, as he 
reveals in his later works like Interpretation and Social Criticism and Thick and Thin. 
Walzer’s feigned ignorance, I believe, is a ruse for him to advance his practical 
arguments without getting mired in philosophical questions. In Just and Unjust Wars 
he simply holds the assumption that the rights to life and liberty are inalienable and 
inviolable. This assumption is sufficient for him to develop a robust account of 
international ethics. This assumption has also allowed me to draw further insights into 
his political thought. For instance, I’ve already argued in Chapter One that Walzer’s 
rights are best sustained in a Rousseauian common life and secured through the 
authority of the state. In Chapter Two, I’ve also argued that Walzer’s moral judgment 
is one that aims to defend the lives and liberties of all individuals in international and 
domestic politics.  
But Walzer could challenge my reading of his position on rights as inalienable 
and inviolable. For instance, he argues in Spheres of Justice that the Hindu caste 
system is inherently just even though its practices are radically incompatible with the 
standards of human rights. Complex equality is still possible within the caste society 
but it would not be as differentiated as how he has conceived for American society. 
For the caste system itself presupposes an integration of social meanings in which 
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one’s birth has implications for his or her rights in the spheres of education, welfare, 
office, among others (SJ 27). Justice must therefore be studied within the social 
meanings of the caste system. “Social meanings need not be harmonious; sometimes 
they provide only the intellectual structure within which distributions are debated… 
There are no external or universal principles that can replace [the intellectual 
structure]. Every substantive account of distributive justice is a local account” (SJ 
314). 
 One should not confuse Walzer’s argument for religious toleration of the caste 
system with political toleration of oppressive regimes such as those mentioned in 
“The Moral Standing of States.” In that essay he still has an eye on the rights of the 
oppressed. After all, his argument for nonintervention is based not on respect for the 
tyrant’s authority but on respect for the community’s right of revolution. Military 
intervention is always a moral possibility should oppression turn into enslavement. 
However, I believe that Walzer would argue that it is not justifiable, in principle, to 
intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of a religious community. Here, within the 
context of a traditional caste society, the assumption that he holds is that members 
such as the untouchables in the past accepted that they were not entitled to the rights 
of other castes because of their preordained standings within a religious and 
hierarchical social system. Walzer does suggest that there is scope for foreigners to 
“try to convince” (SJ 314) caste members that their doctrines are false, but only that 
they do so sensitively. Persuasion, rather than forceful (or military) coercion, is 
Walzer’s way of effecting social change.  
 However, by suggesting that foreigners could actually reform or even 
revolutionize the intellectual structure of a moral community, Walzer does not 
actually explain why the caste system is inherently just. Rather, he has subtly changed 
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his discourse from moral philosophy to political ideology. This is in fact a point made 
by Walzer himself:  
 
It is in the study of these struggles that I have sought the guiding 
thread of my own argument [in Spheres of Justice]… Some group of 
men and women—class, caste, strata, estate, alliance, or social 
formation—comes to enjoy a monopoly or a near monopoly of some 
dominant good… This dominant good is more or less systematically 
converted into all sorts of other goods… Perhaps the ideology that 
justifies the seizure is widely believed to be true. But resentment and 
resistance are (almost) as pervasive as belief. There are always some 
people, and after a time there are a great many, who think the seizure is 
not justice but usurpation (SJ 12).  
 
Quite evidently, Walzer does not think that his equivocation between moral 
philosophy and political ideology is problematic. But there is a potential weakness in 
the above spirited passage that could undermine his overall idea of justice in Just and 
Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice. By suggesting that justice is a matter of 
ideological contestation (whether from the standpoint of those who control the means 
of ideological production or those who resist the dominant ideologies of the ruling 
classes or powers), Walzer is in-effect saying that the universality of rights in Just and 
Unjust Wars is not immutable, since it is possibly a product of ideology and therefore 
susceptible to changes across space and time.76 The charge of inconsistency therefore 
                                                
76 See Susan Moller Okin, “Justice and Gender,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 16:1 (Winter 1987), for 
her criticism that Walzer’s thesis in Spheres of Justice is one that reinforces the ideologies of those 
who are in power, especially those in patriarchal or religious communities, 52 – 64.    
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stands—there appears to be no way to resolve the incompatibility between the 
relativism of Spheres of Justice and the universalism of Just and Unjust Wars.  
A rejoinder I want to develop in this chapter is the proposition that Walzer’s 
idea of rights is based on a foundation that is inter-subjective in character. Inter-
subjectivity implies that moral ideas (such as the idea of rights) are “universal” to the 
extent that they are shared across different moral communities but not necessarily 
recognized by all. For instance, the “Golden Rule” of doing justice to others in the 
same way that we expect from others, is a rule found in Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam but not across all religions. For Walzer, the inter-subjective foundation of 
morality is sufficiently resilient for him to proceed with his account of international 
ethics in Just and Unjust Wars and American social liberalism in Spheres of Justice. 
His refusal to condemn the caste community as abstractly unjust does not spring from 
an alleged relativism that allows him to abandon the centrality of rights in Spheres of 
Justice. Nor is he implying that the universal “ideology” of rights could substantially 
evolved over a great period of time. Rather, he is arguing that the mores of the Hindu 
caste system are significantly different from the shared beliefs of other civilizations or 
communities. 
In this chapter, I will develop my proposition by studying Walzer’s later 
works: Interpretation and Social Criticism and Thick and Thin. Although there is less 
about Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice in this chapter, I am not steering 
away from my fundamental aim of defending a relationship between the books. 
Rather, I am considering his later works so that we can have a better understanding of 
the evolution of his political thought that, in my view, has been consistent since the 
publications of Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice. But before we study his 
understanding on inter-subjectivity, it will be helpful to briefly consider Kant’s notion 
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of objectivity. Although Walzer rarely refers to Kant in his major works, he often 
criticizes Rawls, whose method of moral inquiry in A Theory of Justice is one that 
models Kant’s framework in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (henceforth 
Groundwork).77 To understand the Groundwork is to understand that the Kantian 
tradition of moral inquiry is grounded in reason: the logical implications of precepts 
that are independent of people’s beliefs. This can be meaningfully contrasted with 
Walzer’s version discussed in Interpretation and Social Criticism and Thick and Thin, 
which is based on beliefs: the opinions and convictions of people across different 
traditions. It is this methodological difference that establishes the difference between 
the rational objectivity of Kant’s moral philosophy and inter-subjectivity of Walzer’s 
philosophy. Let me therefore briefly survey Kant’s method of inquiry in Groundwork 
before I study Walzer’s version in the later part of this chapter.  
 
3.1 The Objectivity of Kantian Philosophy 
 
The a priori framework of Groundwork is admittedly a highly complex subject that I 
find difficult, within the space of this chapter, to provide a thorough analysis. What I 
intend to present here is therefore not so much an explanation or a criticism of the 
philosophical arguments in Groundwork but a discussion of the intellectual spirit 
behind Kant’s moral philosophy and how that tradition has been carried on by 
philosophers such as Alan Donagan and Rawls.  
In Groundwork, Kant lays out a core proposition: that there are two parts in 
ethics, one based on the empirical study of human experience and the other based on 
the metaphysical study of a priori principles. The former can also be understood as a 
                                                
77 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press), 10.  
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form of practical anthropology and the latter as moral philosophy. Kant argues that 
philosophers must never conflate or confuse the study of practical anthropology with 
the study of moral philosophy. Just as understanding the internal mechanism of a 
watch does not require the watchmaker to study the nature of time, so is the case in 
ethics where the study of practical anthropology is fundamentally different from the 
study of moral philosophy. The difference is one of method: practical anthropology is 
based on ordinary reasoning that involves a comparison of beliefs to establish 
common moral principles, moral philosophy on pure reasoning that involves the 
postulation of a few fundamental assumptions or truisms of nature or human nature 
and a subsequent logical treatment of these assumptions to establish universal moral 
truths. Before I further explain the respective functions of ordinary and pure 
reasoning, it is useful to note that it is this methodological distinction that allows Kant 
to assert that the coherence of pure ethics is never dependent on the stability (or 
instability) of human experience. By pure reasoning alone, philosophers can establish 
an objective moral foundation that is impregnable against the indeterminate and 
shifting forces of human beliefs and opinions.  
Pure reasoning therefore has an important role in the metaphysics of morality, 
the underlying nature of how people make moral judgments in human relationships. 
Although moral judgment involves interpreting principles that can be derived from 
either practical anthropology or moral philosophy, moral judgment has more in 
common with practical anthropology since both are practical traditions that predicate 
on human conduct. Moral judgment requires reasoning, but only ordinary reasoning. 
Ordinary reasoning has actually been demonstrated in my earlier chapter. My study of 
Walzer’s interpretative methodology (casuistry in Just and Unjust Wars and social 
criticism in Spheres of Justice) is a form of ordinary reasoning that involves the 
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judgment of particular circumstances in international or domestic politics and the 
interpretation of moral or legal principles found in international ethics or the mores of 
particular moral communities. It ought to be stressed that Walzer’s understanding or 
exercise of moral judgment is by no means ordinary to the point of being simple, for 
his arguments are sophisticated, meticulous and nuanced, grounded within the core 
ideas of common life, authority and human rights. Although these ideas operate at the 
conceptual level of Walzer’s political thought, they do not go far enough to explain 
the a priori principles of, say, what it means to be a rational moral being. But Walzer 
is not interested in the metaphysics of morality—common life, authority and human 
rights are sufficiently resilient for him to develop a coherent idea of justice in Just and 
Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice.    
However, Kant argues that moralists should never claim confidence in their 
moral judgments or the moral concepts presupposed in their ordinary reasoning until 
the concepts themselves are rooted in a metaphysical and immutable foundation that 
is derived from pure reasoning:  
 
All moral concepts have their seat and origin in reason completely a 
priori, and indeed in the most ordinary human reason just as much as 
in the most highly speculative: they cannot be abstracted from any 
empirical, and therefore merely contingent, knowledge. In this purity 
of their origin is to be found their very worthiness to serve as supreme 
practical principles… It is not only a requirement of the utmost 
necessity in respect of theory, where our concern is solely with 
speculation, but is also of the utmost practical importance, to draw 
these concepts and laws from pure reason… Since moral laws have to 
hold for every rational being as such, we ought rather to derive our 
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principles from the general concept of a rational being as such, and on 
this basis to expound the whole of ethics—which requires 
anthropology for its application to man—at first independently as pure 
philosophy, that is, entirely as metaphysics.78  
 
In the above passage, Kant once again alerts moral theorists to be clear about the 
distinction between moral philosophy (grounded in pure reasoning) and practical 
anthropology (based on ordinary reasoning). Furthermore, and more importantly for 
the purpose of our discussion, he argues that the pure reasoning of moral philosophy 
must precede the ordinary reasoning of moral experience, if moralists are to make any 
sense out of the ephemeral nature of human experience itself. Without a moral 
foundation that originates from pure reasoning, ordinary reason will at some point fall 
“into sheer unintelligibility and self-contradiction, or at least into a chaos of 
uncertainty, obscurity, and vacillation.”79 Walzer’s portrait of Camus is a good 
example of substituting sentimental reasoning for ordinary moral reasoning when he 
cannot seek further recourse from the latter: “I believe in justice, but I will defend my 
mother before justice” (CC 145). Walzer does not find it problematic that Camus’s 
loyalty with the pied noir community in Algeria is based not on moral principles but 
on sentiments. Consequently, his emphasis on Camus’s sentimentality (which in some 
measure is an important ingredient in his understanding of social criticism) has the 
unfortunate effect of obscuring the clarity of his moral vision in Just and Unjust Wars 
and related essays concerning the types of just and unjust wars operating in Algeria.80   
It is not enough, then, that the study of morality be based on practical 
experience. For experience alone cannot tell us whether an action proceeds from 
                                                
78 Kant, Groundwork, 79.  
79 Ibid., 72. 
80 See Chapter 2 (Section 2.2) for my discussion on Camus’s Algerian War.   
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moral principles or from natural inclinations (even good ones): we might identify with 
Camus’s love for France, or even Hitler’s love for Germany, but our love is incapable 
of helping us to distinguish between good and evil. It is possible that our inclination 
to love may coincide with the moral duty to do good, as with a philanthropist who, in 
his love for children, donates regularly to an orphanage. But, from Kant’s point of 
view, such an act is strictly speaking void of moral content if the philanthropist is also 
motivated to further his own sense of happiness and fulfillment. But suppose there is a 
person who is so overwhelmed with sorrow that he is incapable of lifting his own 
spirit, let alone others, but “tears himself out of this deadly insensibility” to help those 
in distress not out of inclination but for the sake of duty. His action, Kant argues, has 
genuine moral worth. This explains why, he suggests, Scripture commands us to love 
not only our neighbor but also our enemy, for it is in loving our enemy can we begin 
to understand the substance of morality.81 Of course, Kant (unlike God) is not saying 
that we have to like Hitler, only that we must regard him as an agent responsible for 
his actions. He is also saying that from the standpoint of moral philosophy, 
systematically derived moral principles may be counter-intuitive to our practical 
experience of what is the right or wrong thing to do. Since human judgment (or 
ordinary reasoning), in that sense, is susceptible to a multitude of sentiments, desires 
and impulses, man needs to rely on a higher form of reasoning that can filter away his 
natural inclinations.  
For Kant, the aim of moral philosophy is not to abstract a common inclination 
of mankind through ordinary reasoning but to identify, through pure reasoning, an 
immutable moral principle—what he calls a supreme principle of morality—that can 
buttress the edifice of everyday morality. This supreme principle, Kant argues, is 
                                                
81 Kant, Groundwork, 65 – 67.  
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found in the following version of the categorical imperative: Act only on that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. 
So, suppose a person wants to lie in order to avoid the embarrassment of making an 
untruthful promise. Kant argues that while the person can will himself to lie, he 
cannot will that lying be made into a universal law, because in accordance with such a 
law, it would be pointless for anyone to keep a promise. This maxim, “as soon as it 
was made a universal law, would be bound to annul itself.”82 After a series of similar 
exercises exploring different formulation the categorical imperative, Kant arrives at 
the following maxim: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in 
your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at 
the same time as an end.83 
Many philosophers, including Donagan and Rawls, have followed Kant’s 
method of moral inquiry even though the contents of their arguments are slightly 
different. Donagan’s theory of common morality in The Theory of Morality is 
particularly relevant here as a preliminary to Walzer’s alternative (and inter-
subjective) understanding of common morality (JUJW xxii).84 For Donagan, common 
morality is grounded in precepts that are based not on customary moral beliefs but on 
rational criticism and reconstruction of those.85 It is not philosophically problematic 
that his precepts are derived historically from the Hebrew-Christian moral tradition. 
In fact, he finds it useful to begin an inquiry into the a priori lineaments of common 
morality. So, for instance, he argues that common morality can only be coherent if 
one makes certain metaphysical assumptions of what it means to be a rational human 
being. One assumption is the understanding that one is a human being only from the 
                                                
82 Ibid., 71.  
83 Ibid., 96.  
84 For a comparative study between Walzer’s and Donagan’s common morality, see Boyle, “Just and 
Unjust Wars: Casuistry and the Boundaries of the Moral World.” 
85 Donagan, Theory of Morality, 3. 
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point when life begins to when it ends in death. Different religions may have different 
conceptions of life after death but the differences do not undermine his theory of 
morality, for even if the Hindu experience of Karma (the transference of soul from 
one incarnation to another) is true, it is imperceptible within human experience and 
therefore beyond the theoretical scope of common morality.  
After defining what it means to be a human being and delimiting the 
boundaries of human agency, Donagan arrives at a fundamental principle that in 
essence restates Kant’s categorical imperative: It is impermissible not to respect every 
human being, oneself or any other, as a rational creature.86 Common morality, for 
Donagan, is a systematic treatment of this fundamental principle with two types of 
questions: “first-order” questions about the permissibility and impermissibility of 
actions and “second-order” questions about the culpability and inculpability of agents. 
Whereas first-order questions are concerned with observable actions, second-order 
questions are concerned with unobservable intentions. All questions of morality in 
human relationships, Donagan argues, can be understood within this system of first-
order and second-order moral reasoning.87   
Unlike Donagan’s system of common morality, Walzer’s understanding of 
common morality is not grounded in philosophical reasoning but on a practical 
observation that morality is already self-evident: “The Athenians shared a moral 
vocabulary, shared it with the people of Mytilene and Melos; and allowing for 
cultural differences, they share it with us too” (JUJW 11). The self-evidence of 
morality is telling even when moral discourses are shrouded in realism and deceptive 
arguments: “The clearest evidence for the stability of our values over time is the 
unchanging character of the lies soldiers and statesmen tell. They lie in order to justify 
                                                
86 Ibid., 66 
87 Ibid., 56 
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themselves, and so they describe for us the lineaments of justice. Wherever we find 
hypocrisy, we also find moral knowledge” (JUJW 19). Although Walzer does not 
further explain his intuitive understanding of morality in Just and Unjust Wars, it is 
noticeable that his method of ascertaining moral truths is different from Donagan’s. 
Whereas Donagan’s method is a “top-down” one that relies on a set of assumptions 
about human nature, Walzer’s method is a “bottom-up” one that is contingent on the 
conversations and convictions of mankind. 
 This bottom-up approach is given a more sustained treatment in Interpretation 
and Social Criticism and Thick and Thin, in which Walzer elaborates the importance 
of experience in moral philosophy. Earlier, I had explained how the common life is 
important in Walzer’s political thought, whether it is for the purpose of nurturing the 
civic consciousness of the Rousseauian citizen or shaping sound distributive patterns 
for members within a particular community. In Interpretation and Social Criticism, 
Walzer injects a new perspective into the importance of the common life by arguing 
that all principles in moral philosophy are derived, through interpretation, from the 
experience of moral communities. This seems like a straightforward argument but the 
philosophical implications are significant. For the argument not only challenges the 
Kantian distinction between the pure reasoning of moral philosophy and the ordinary 
reasoning of moral experience, but also the supremacy of pure reasoning over 
ordinary reasoning.  
 
3.2 The Inter-Subjectivity of Walzer’s Moral Philosophy 
 
Philosophers who privilege the top-down approach to morality, Walzer argues, 
have essentially been deceived by their own illusions of objectivity. First, 
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objectivity is a chimera because moral principles always grow out of the 
particularistic experience of moral communities. A purported “objective” principle 
is at best an inter-subjective one: one that is already shared or understood by 
different moral communities. And, second, even if a moral principle can be shown 
to be objectively true—a principle discerned in the light of the Sun and not from 
experience in the Cave—its relevance is still determined by the varied and 
subjective interpretations of the community. This is the kind of interpretation that I 
was exploring in Chapter Two, where I discussed how Walzer represents the 
collective view of everyday people in his moral judgment. His commitment to 
stand on the side of everyday people explains his position concerning the 
imperative of defending one’s own people in a time of supreme emergency. It also 
explains his style of social criticism, which requires the critic to carefully interpret 
the cultural language of the community before advocating social change.  
 There are, therefore, two kinds of interpretation in Interpretation and Social 
Criticism. The first belongs to an intellectual tradition, at the level of a community of 
moral theorists, where interpretation is understood as a mode of inquiry. The second 
belongs to a practical tradition, at the level of members of a moral community, where 
interpretation is understood in its more conventional sense, as in the case when a 
principle is subjected to specific interpretations by particular persons in particular 
circumstances.88 The first argument is also Walzer’s direct counter-argument to 
scholars in the Kantian tradition, since he is essentially arguing that the Kantian top-
down proceeding of moral inquiry is flawed. Walzer defends his proposition by first 
suggesting how moral philosophy generally proceeds in one of the following paths: 
discovery, invention and interpretation.  
                                                
88 I’ve relied on Terry Nardin’s distinction between intellectual traditions and practical traditions in 
Traditions of International Ethics, eds. Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), Chapter 1, 1 – 2.   
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A discoverer could be a prophet, who seeks to discovers God’s tenets and 
make his or her discoveries known (ISC 4). Walzer suggests that a non-religious 
discoverer could be the natural law theorist, who only needs to “step back” from the 
parochial Cave to abstract common moral principles. Walzer, however, finds the 
secular form of discovery redundant since philosophers can only discover what 
society already knows: “Most often, the moral principles here delivered to us are 
already in our possession, incorporated, as it were, long ago, familiar and well-
thumbed by now… Consider Nagel’s discovery of an objective moral principle: that 
we should not be indifferent to the suffering of other people. I acknowledge the 
principle but miss the excitement of revelation. I knew that already” (ISC 6). Unlike 
discoverers, inventors do not seek to unearth the hidden laws of the moral world, but 
“create what God would have created” (ISC 12). Moral creativity, however, is 
subjected to two constraints. First, inventors have vastly different ideas of how God’s 
decrees should look like. Consequently, no authority on Earth can enforce and 
universalize a set of “God-inspired” moral principles in a pluralistic world (ISC 13). It 
follows that even if inventors could conceive a conception of goodness that is 
epistemologically universal, they must still, in the end, invent principles that are 
grounded within the ontology of Man. An invented principle is therefore not so useful 
or creative after all; it is either a highly idealized principle that is practically useless or 
a high-sounding principle that in fact has been derived from within particular 
understandings of human conduct.  
“Philosophical discovery and invention (leaving aside divine revelation) are 
disguised interpretations; there is really only one path in moral philosophy… The 
experience of moral argument is best understood in the interpretative mode” (ISC 21). 
This is Walzer’s fundamental proposition in Interpretation and Social Criticism. The 
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function of interpretation (as a mode of inquiry within a community of moral 
theorists) can be further understood in two ways. One is a straightforward method of 
interpreting the complex, nuanced practices of a community and boiling the practices 
into a few simple rules, say, a rule for distributing healthcare within an American 
community. This is also Walzer’s method of proceeding in Spheres of Justice, where 
he breaks down the social structure of the United States into a few categories (or 
spheres)—welfare, education, politics, religion and so forth—and then, within each 
category, distill a set of principles that is useful for his idea of distributive justice. 
Another is a more sophisticated technique of essentializing a moral principle from 
within a tradition, as exemplified by Donagan’s interpretation of the Hebrew-
Christian tradition in his theory of common morality.   
Whether interpretation is straightforward or sophisticated in design, a 
fundamental argument that Walzer wants to make is the assertion that the bottom-up 
approach is the only proceeding that moral theorists can take to arrive at principles 
that are useful for the judgment of human conduct—not the top-down approach 
favored by Kantian scholars. A Kantian scholar that Walzer has in mind in 
Interpretation and Social Criticism (and also in Spheres of Justice) is Rawls. For 
Rawls, a pure principle of distributive justice is only possible if philosophers are able 
to filter out the parochial inclinations of man. Such is his aim in A Theory of Justice 
as he postulates how free and equal persons would rationally behave at the original 
position, an initial position where everyone is shrouded by a veil of ignorance; that is 
to say, each is ignorant of his or her potential intelligence, class and status in society, 
gender and so forth. At the original position, Rawls argues that it is possible to 
construct a distributive principle—the difference principle—that defines the basic 
terms of ethical obligations that people have towards one another in a real society in a 
 104 
fair manner. Like the a priori framework of Kant’s philosophy, “the original position 
is a purely hypothetical situation. Nothing resembling it need ever take place… [It] is 
not intended to explain human conduct except insofar as it tries to account for our 
moral judgments and helps to explain our having a sense of justice.”89  
But Walzer argues that the agents at the original position are not as asocial as 
Rawls has made them out to be. For they actually belong to “a historically specific 
and peculiar understanding of a human life” (TT 24).  Rawls, of course, will agree 
with Walzer since he has already argued in Political Liberalism that the difference 
principle is only applicable within the context of a Western democratic tradition, 
where citizens are already predisposed with ideas of freedom and equality.90 Rawls’s 
clarification, however, serves to reinforce Walzer’s argument that the paths of 
discovery and invention are ultimately interpreted from somewhere, either from the 
Word of God or from the word of Man. Moral philosophy is—and has always been—
grounded in the experience of mankind. “We [referring to philosophers]… start from 
where are. Where we are, however, is always someplace of value” (ISC 17). 
 I’ve been discussing interpretation as a mode of inquiry among a community 
of moral theorists. There is also a simpler and more conventional way to understand 
interpretation, which is the way everyday people interpret moral principles in 
particular circumstances. Whether a principle is derived philosophically or 
empirically, it is always subjected to interpretation. In “Objectivity and Social 
Meaning,” Walzer gives the example of a table to suggest the manifold interpretations 
of objective principles. A simple object like the table can be interpreted as a desk, a 
                                                
89 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 3. 
90 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). See Lecture I 
(especially Section 4, 5 and 6) for his distinction between a moral conception of justice and a political 
conception of justice. It is the latter conception, one that presupposes “a well-ordered democratic 
society,” that allows Rawls to sketch an account of a political conception of the person (one who is free 
and equal) at the original position.  
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workbench, a butcher’s block or an altar (TP 40). Without these subjective 
perceptions, a table cannot assert its own purposeful meaning beyond the objective 
description of, say, “a flat piece of wood with a supporting structure” (TP 41). The 
same can be said for Rawls’s difference principle. Despite its neutral character, 
Walzer argues that “[a] body of literature… has grown up already around the 
Rawlsian difference principle, focused most importantly on the question of equality: 
how egalitarian would the principle actually be in its effects? And then: how 
egalitarian was it meant to be? How egalitarian should it be” (ISC 27)? The lack of 
consensus means that justice is—once again—best understood from the bottom and 
not the top, how it is realized from within the particular practices of a community 
rather than how it is idealized from within the discourses of moral philosophy.  
 
The Inter-Subjective Universalism of Thin Morality 
 
Because morality is always interpretative in character (whether from the standpoint of 
moral theorists or everyday people), Walzer suggests that moral theorists ought to 
abandon the quest of postulating universal principles from the speculative position of 
the Sun and develop a new way of thinking about universalism that is contingent on 
the worldliness of the Cave. Such is his aim in Thick and Thin where he wants to 
“describe and defend a certain sort of universalism” (TT x) that is different from the 
way philosophers commonly conceive it.91  
 To facilitate our understanding of universalism in Thick and Thin, I find it 
helpful to regard Walzer’s version as “inter-subjective universalism” and Kant’s 
                                                
91 A similar argument is made in another essay, “Universalism and Jewish Values” (web version 
available at http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/114.html), where Walzer argues for a “low-
flying” form of universalism that is “worked out in close contact with the political landscape” and “its 
crucial moral perception is the existence of other nations as moral and legal agents.”  
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version as “philosophical universalism.” The distinction between the two can be 
teased out by the latter’s resistance to worldly concerns. Kant’s maxim that a person 
should be respected as an end does not require acceptance by moral communities 
even if it proves to be of practical use to them. For Kant’s priority is not to carry out 
empirical research concerning the widespread acceptance of his maxim but to 
speculate on its coherence in, say, justifying the wrongfulness of cannibalism. In 
comparison, an inter-subjective universalism is not based on reason but beliefs and 
practice that are reiterated in different cultures across space and time, 
notwithstanding the “odd anthropological example” (ISC 24) of, say, a cannibalistic 
community that rejects the idea that cannibalism is wrong. Peter Sutch, in his study of 
Walzer’s moral theory, argues that “the idea of reiteration is extremely important… as 
it is the vehicle by which we move (albeit temporarily) from particularism to 
universalism.”92 However, a reiterated universal principle is susceptible to criticisms 
of relativism and limited usefulness in moral dilemmas. Let me first provide a brief 
review of Thick and Thin before further considering these two criticisms.    
 In Thick and Thin, Walzer argues that the language of morality is 
“immediately accessible” and has “a familiar terrain” (TT 5) that presupposes a range 
of ideas such as fairness, equality and freedom. Morality is intuitive, as his personal 
anecdote suggests:  
 
I want to begin my argument by recalling a picture… It is a picture of 
people marching in the streets of Prague; they carry signs, some of 
which say, simply, “Truth” and others “Justice.” When I saw the 
picture, I knew immediately what the signs meant—and so did 
                                                
92 Peter Sutch, Ethics, Justice and International Relations: Constructing an International Community 
(New York: Routledge, 2001), 146. 
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everyone else who saw the same picture… [These] citizens of Prague 
were not marching in defense of utilitarian equality or John Rawls’s 
difference principle or any philosophical theory of desert or merit or 
entitlement… What they meant by the “justice” inscribed on their 
signs, however, was simple enough: an end to arbitrary arrests, equal 
and impartial law enforcement, the abolition of the privileges and 
prerogatives of the party elite—common, garden variety justice (TT 1 
– 2). 
 
Whether one is living in modern Prague or in medieval Athens, our common response 
to human suffering suggests that we share a “thin” (or “minimalist”) set of moral 
ideas that are found in different communities. Within a community itself, such moral 
ideas become “thick” (or “maximalist”) in character, for they are often imbued with 
historical references, cultural specificities, social memories and religious customs.  
 More importantly, Walzer argues that morality is always experienced and 
understood in its thick form before it is thinly understood. His view is consistent with 
his argument in Interpretation and Social Criticism that the study of morality is 
always a bottom-up inquiry. Thin morality is therefore not foundational but merely a 
part of thick morality. This is a crucial perspective that he repeatedly reinforces in 
Thick and Thin:  
 
Men and women everywhere begin with some common idea or 
principle or set of ideas and principles, which they then work up in 
many different ways. They start thin, as it were, and thicken with age, 
as if in accordance with our deepest intuition about what it means to 
develop or mature. But our intuition is wrong here. Morality is thick 
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from the beginning, culturally integrated, fully resonant, and it reveals 
itself thinly only on special occasions, when moral language is turned 
to specific purposes (TT 4).  
 
The hope that minimalism, grounded and expanded, might serve the 
cause of a universal critique is a false hope. Minimalism makes for a 
certain limited, though important and heartening, solidarity. It doesn’t 
make for a full-blooded doctrine (TT 11). 
 
The only reason we can empathize with the Prague demonstrators is because of our 
own experience of virtue and justice in our families, religious institutions and other 
communal associations. Moral knowledge is therefore never developed from a top-
down philosophical proceeding. It is latent in our moral experience and “liberated 
from its embeddedness” (TT 3) during an international crisis like the Second World 
War. In the hour of decision, the meaning of “justice” is no longer debated but 
intuitively understood and heroically fought for.  
Despite the overall cogency of Walzer’s thick and thin thesis, his notion of 
“thin” morality is ambiguous. In my view, he has two conceptions of thin morality:  
 
(1) A small set of elementary principles shared among different communities. 
Shared morality may be applied in many (or a few) communities but it does not 
need to be recognized by all. It is usually expressed in terms of human rights or 
“negative injunctions” such as “rules against murder, deceit, torture, oppression, 
and tyranny” (TT 10). Rights should not be mistaken as a Western invention, 
for the language of rights is translatable and comprehensible in non-Western 
traditions (TT 10). A thin shared morality is evident in the current international 
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society. The Vienna Declaration, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the United Nations Charter are examples of core legal human rights documents 
ratified or signed by Western, Middle Eastern, and Asian states. Putting aside 
the lack of political will among states to comply with these international moral 
standards, they at least express principles of a thin morality shared among the 
major civilizations of the world.  
 
(2) A set of thicker but nonetheless still thin principles specific to the needs of a 
community (TT 6 – 7). Unlike the above, thin morality of this sort is not 
necessarily widely accepted. An example Walzer gives is Jurgen Habermas’s 
ideal speech theory. As with Rawls’s difference principle, rational agents in 
Habermas’s theory are assumed to be capable of rational discourse—they must 
be “liberated from the bonds of particularism, else they will never produce the 
rational outcome that they require” (ISC 11 – 12). But Walzer also argues that 
Habermas’s discursive principles are “more than minimal” since they can only 
work within a set of liberal ideas such as the equality of all participants and 
their freedom from fear. “The thin morality is already very thick—with an 
entirely decent liberal or social democratic thickness” (TT 12)?93  
 
In my view, conception (1) is useful to help us understand the inter-subjective 
character of common morality in Just and Unjust Wars and conception (2) the 
subjective character of distributive justice in Spheres of Justice. For the rest of this 
section, let me focus on conception (1) to better understand the strength and 
weaknesses of inter-subjective universalism.  
                                                
93 See Walzer’s essay, “A Critique of Philosophical Conversation” (TP, Chapter 2), for his more 
detailed criticism of Habermasian philosophy.  
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Walzer argues that the minimalism of conception (1) “is less the product of 
[philosophical] persuasion than of mutual recognition among the protagonists of 
different fully developed moral cultures. It consists in principles and rules that are 
reiterated in different times and places, and that are seen to be similar even though 
they are expressed in different idioms and reflect different histories and different 
versions of the world” (TT 17). In other words, practical observation, common sense 
wisdom and moral intuition are sufficient for him to identify moral ideas that appear 
in different communities. Take, for example, the idea of self-determination. Although 
the idea of self-determination is historically expressed in different ways, with some 
political communities preferring a more democratic tradition and others favoring a 
more revolutionary approach, Walzer argues that the idea itself “has been reiterated in 
many different times and places, always in some local idiom and with a set of 
maximalist accompaniments” (TT 67 – 68). In Walzer’s teleology, History—not 
Reason—is stable enough to provide moral instructions for mankind, for there are 
some moral ideas that are always reiterated across space and time.94 Common 
morality is universal not because it is grounded in a priori reasoning but because its 
contents are “the [historical] products of many people talking, of real if always 
tentative, intermittent, and unfinished conversations. We might best think of them not 
as discovered or invented but rather as emergent prohibitions, the work of many 
years, of trial and error, of failed, partial, and insecure understandings” (ISC 24).  
But wouldn’t a reliance on the conversation of mankind lead to a relativistic 
understanding of morality? Miller makes this point when he asks if Walzer’s thick 
                                                
94 A similar argument concerning the reiteration of universal ideas is made in “Nation and Universe” 
(TP, Chapter 12). “The idea of reiteration… reflects an understanding that morality is made again and 
again… Moral creativity is plural in its incidence and differentiated in its outcomes—and yet, it is not 
wholly differentiated, as if the agents and subjects of all moralities had no common kinship. In fact, 
they can recognize themselves and one another as moral makers, and from this recognition there 
follows the minimalist universalism of reiteration” (TP 199). 
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and thin thesis is one that could erode the idea of human rights should the world be 
dominated by a few powerful civilizations (TT 302). Walzer’s reply to Miller is that 
even if Hitler’s Third Reich had successfully lasted a full thousand years, it is unlikely 
that the idea of rights would disappear. For he believes that in places where the 
experience of tyranny is similar, the people’s moral response to tyranny would also be 
similar (TP 303). My own response to Miller is that Walzer’s reiterative universalism 
does not mean that moral ideas are borrowed or imitated among civilizations (for this 
means that a powerful civilization could influence and dictate the historical evolution 
of moral discourse). Universal moral ideas, in Walzer’s teleology, are independently 
arrived at: “When ancient Jews and Gauls defended their freedom against the 
Romans, the arguments they made were hardly democratic; nor were they cast in the 
language of rights. But we have little difficulty recognizing the principle [of self-
determination] even in alien idioms” (TT 68).95 In my view, the inadvertent repetition 
of moral ideas across space and time is in itself a safeguard against the quandary of 
moral relativism, for it is unlikely that ancient Jews and Gauls could dictate 
contemporary moral discourses.  
Therefore, although there are civilizations and moral communities that are 
more overbearing than others, Walzer believes that the world of moral experience is 
resilient enough for mankind to establish a thin moral code that is effective for a 
minimum form of criticism:  
 
One might say that the moral world is authoritative for us because it 
provides us with everything we need to live a moral life, including the 
capacity for reflection and criticism. No doubt some moralities are 
                                                
95 Again, see “Nation and Universe” for a similar argument concerning the inadvertent (rather than 
deliberate) repetition of moral ideas.  
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more “critical” than others, but that does not mean they are better (or 
worse). It is more likely that they provide, roughly, what their 
protagonists need… The moral world and the social world are more or 
less coherent, but they are never more than more or less coherent (ISC 
21 – 22) 
 
No doubt, the conversation of mankind does suffer from occasional incoherence, but 
Walzer believes it is not radically incoherent to the point that we cannot recognize the 
impermissibility of murder: “Murder as a way of distributing life and death, for 
example, whether it is the work of a neighborhood thug or the secret police, is 
everywhere ruled out” (TT 26). Therefore, not only is the criticism of relativism 
unfounded, there is also a refreshing simplicity in Walzer’s moral philosophy. Rather 
than relying on complex a priori reasoning concerning the obvious wrongfulness of 
an action like murder, experience alone is sufficient for such an undertaking.    
But there is a deeper problem in Walzer’s inter-subjective conception of thin 
morality, which is its unreliability in cases of moral dilemmas. Thin morality breaks 
down when people cannot arrive at a consensus on difficult ethical issues such as the 
rightness of abortion, euthanasia or torture in the classic “ticking-bomb” scenario. 
This is also Donagan’s criticism of Walzer’s argument in “Political Action: The 
Problem of Dirty Hands” when he says that his justification for the permissibility of 
torture in the ticking-bomb scenario is “curious.”96 To be certain, Walzer does argue 
in the essay that torture is morally impermissible, even for those who are responsible 
for terrorist campaigns (TP 294, n. 7). But suppose a morally upright politician 
discovered that a terrorist was hiding a bomb in a building and that it would explode 
within a day, what would be his possible recourses? In such a scenario, Walzer argues 
                                                
96 Donagan, Theory of Morality, 188.  
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that torturing the terrorist is prudentially—but not morally—permissible. Because the 
politician has committed a moral offence, he must also bear a sense of guilt as a form 
of penance. This is also Walzer’s revival of Weber’s “tragic hero,” a moral politician 
who, because of his vocation, is forced to do bad for the good of his people (TP 290 – 
291). At the same time, Walzer, inspired by the characters of Camus’s Just Assassins, 
suggests that the politician may have to end his political career as a form of public 
penance to atone for his private guilt, just as the assassins in Camus’s novel were 
prepared to die under the laws of the despotic rulers they connived to kill (TP 291 – 
292).  
Donagan, however, argues that exacting such a penance is hypocritical, for “if 
citizens are unwilling to forgo what can only be obtained by actions they are 
unwilling to do themselves, they are not entitled to exact penance from anybody they 
appoint to do them on their behalf.”97 In other words, it is hypocritical on the part of 
the moral community if they chose a leader on the condition that the leader could 
carry out immoral deeds on their behalf—and be punished by the community itself. 98 
I will venture to say that the politician is a “tragic hero” not when he has to make a 
difficult decision that betrays his conscience, but when he stands by his conscience—
and the moral values of his community which his community, in its emergency, 
would betray—even if this means that his penance is that his own people would 
blame him for failing to find the bomb. Such a portrait of the tragic hero is more 
                                                
97 Donagan, Theory of Morality, 184. 
98 It is useful to note that Donagan does argue that torture can be permissible, within the conditions of 
common morality, if a terrorist is unable to satisfy the conditions for immunity to violence. If it is 
assumed that evacuating the people in a building is impossible and a terrorist is known (not suspected) 
to deliberately want to harm the lives of innocent persons by withholding his knowledge of the bomb’s 
location, Donagan suggests that the terrorist can be tortured because he has set in place a train of events 
that will allow “the consummation of murders and mutilations” to take place, and in doing so lost his 
immunity to coercion aimed at stopping it. See Theory of Morality, 187 – 189.   
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consistent with Walzer’s Rousseauian conception of the moral community, since it 
calls for both the people and the leader to stand by their moral ethos.99  
 
3.3 Conclusion  
 
I’ve suggested how the inter-subjective foundation of Walzer’s thin morality is 
limited in cases of moral dilemmas. Nevertheless, my aim in this chapter is less a 
criticism of his moral foundation than an exposition of how Just and Unjust Wars and 
Spheres of Justice are based on this foundation. Such is my way of defending Walzer 
against the criticism of being an inconsistent theorist who adopts moral universalism 
in Just and Unjust Wars but moral particularism in Spheres of Justice. Both books, 
upon a critical investigation, actually share a common moral architecture that 
proceeds from the beliefs of moral communities.   
 To explain this moral architecture, I found it useful to first consider Kant’s 
Groundwork to understand the meaning of objectivity, and how his objective 
approach towards the study of morality has inspired scholars like Donagan and Rawls.  
From a Kantian perspective, an objective study of morality is one that is studied from 
a priori principles that are independent of the experience of mankind. I then referred 
to Walzer’s arguments in Interpretation and Social Criticism to consider his 
perspective that moral philosophers can actually never escape from human experience 
for all so-called objective principles are, in his view, derived from the particularistic 
practices of thick moral communities. Moral philosophy for Walzer is therefore best 
developed from within the inter-subjective experience of mankind, and not from an 
abstract or metaphysical standpoint. Walzer’s bottom-up approach towards morality is 
                                                
99 See Chapter 1 (Section 1.2) for my discussion of the Rousseauian common life.  
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elaborated in Thick and Thin, where he develops a different form of universalism that 
is contingent on the inadvertent reiteration of moral ideas in History and not 
predicated on the systemic treatment of a priori principles through Reason.  
However, beyond a certain limit, the inter-subjective foundation of Walzer’s 
moral universalism is practically useless, especially in cases where people cannot 
arrive at a consensus on difficult ethical issues such as the rightness of abortion, 
euthanasia or the use of torture in the ticking-bomb scenario. This, in some measure, 
is a setback for a scholar who sees himself more as an applied ethicist than a “pure” 
philosopher. Still, we can now at least understand that the “substructure of the ethical 
world” presupposed in Just and Unjust Wars—a structure that he refuses to engage 
but merely offer “a tour of the rooms” (JUJW xxiii)—is in essence an inter-subjective 
structure. The same structure can also explain his toleration of the caste community in 
Spheres of Justice. His toleration is not because of his relativism, where he abandons 
the centrality of rights in his idea of justice. Rather, it is because of the fact that there 
are communities whose particularistic practices are significantly at odds with the 
inter-subjective moral experience among different moral communities. 
My exposition of moral inter-subjectivity can also clarify recent arguments by 
scholars like Brian Orend and Peter Sutch who connect the arguments of Just and 
Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice using ideas borrowed from Interpretation and 
Social Criticism and Thick and Thin.100 Specifically, they argue that the “thin” theory 
of human rights in Just and Unjust Wars is related to the “thick” mores as discussed 
in Spheres of Justice, through Walzer’s method of “interpretation.” Although their 
arguments are generally sound, I find that they have failed to clarify some ambiguities 
in Walzer’s arguments. As I’ve explained in this chapter, universalism can be inter-
                                                
100 See Brian Orend, Michael Walzer on war and justice, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 
2000); and Peter Sutch, Ethics, Justice and International Relations: Constructing an International 
Community (New York: Routledge 2001), Chapter 6.  
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subjective or objective in character; interpretation can be understood within the 
context of an intellectual community of moral theorists or everyday members of a 
moral community; and thin morality can be understood as either a thin morality of a 
particularistic community or an even thinner moral code that is abstracted from 
different particularistic communities. Orend and Sutch rarely clarify Walzer’s choice 
of words and it consequently becomes difficult to understand their view that thin 
morality in Just and Unjust Wars is somehow connected to thick morality in Spheres 
of Justice.  
In my view, both thick and thin moralities are found in each book (and not 
thick morality in one and thin morality in the other). Within the context of Spheres of 
Justice, thick moral practices can be boiled down to a few simple (but subjective) thin 
rules and principles. Within the context of Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer assumes that 
mankind is able to derive an even thinner (and inter-subjective) set of thin morality, 
based on an observation that some rules and principles are consistently reiterated 
across space and time. Perhaps, scholars who defend Walzer against his critics have 
assumed that he has written Interpretation and Social Criticism and Thick and Thin 
with the charge of inconsistency and relativism in mind. But I do not think that 
Walzer is particularly interested in “back-peddling” to his past to defend the 
coherence of Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice. His later works are 
forward looking, written with the aim of explaining what is already a consistent 
perspective that philosophy should not only be moral but practical. His practical 
worldview does not imply moral incoherence or relativism. It is grounded within an 
inter-subjective moral foundation that, despites it limitations, is sufficiently robust for 
him to support the practical moral judgments he makes in Just and Unjust Wars and 




In some measure, my discussion in Chapter Three could have been raised much 
earlier in this thesis. By first rectifying the misperceptions of the alleged 
inconsistency between the universalism of Just and Unjust Wars and particularism of 
Spheres of Justice, I could then go on to develop my propositions on how the books 
are best related. But organizing my arguments along that line would have distracted 
us from the more important task of clarifying various ambiguous expressions in 
Walzer’s works. I’ve already mentioned in Chapter Three how moral universalism, 
interpretation and thin morality could, depending on the context, be understood in 
different ways. It is worth mentioning that in Chapter One, I’ve dedicated a 
substantial amount of investigation to clarify Walzer’s definition of the political 
community. Although the political community, on a surface reading, contains both 
ideas of the state and the community, I argue that the political community is best 
understood as the state, and the state can be accurately defined as the community in 
its constituted form. I also argued in Chapter One that the common life can be 
understood in two ways, as an intangible set of moral and social values such as those 
found in American civic republicanism, and a more visible set of political principles, 
such as those enshrined in the Constitution of the United States.    
 In my view, any attempt to understand Walzer’s political thought must 
recognize the need to clarify the aforementioned expressions. It is only by 
meticulously exploring the meanings behind his expressions that one could begin to 
evaluate what he really stands for in his idea of justice. Many critics, particularly 
those who accuse him of methodological inconsistency, have essentially failed to 
undertake such a task. My aim in this thesis is to offer a fresh and systematic 
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perspective on Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice, not so much by visiting 
the voluminous reviews, criticisms and comments by other scholars, but by 
investigating the meanings behind his words. Along the way, I found it helpful to 
organize Walzer’s political thought within the framework of what I consider is his 
theory and practice of justice. This, I believe, has yield prospective insights on 
consistent themes that run through the arguments of Just and Unjust Wars and 
Spheres of Justice.  
 Chapter One was therefore an exposition on the conceptual dimension of 
Walzer’s political thought, as I explain how authority, rights and common life are 
core ideas in Just and Unjust Wars and Spheres of Justice. These core ideas, while in 
theoretical tension among themselves, are nonetheless useful for Walzer to resolve 
practical tensions in international and domestic politics. Chapter Two was a study of 
everyday and radical tensions in the books, and how Walzer tries to resolve these 
tensions though a careful interpretation of the circumstances surrounding those 
tensions and the moral principles relevant to those tensions. Chapter Three is, to a 
certain extent, an elaboration of the theoretical arguments in Chapter One. For I was 
essentially expounding on the moral foundation of which Walzer’s idea of justice 
rests upon. This foundation is inter-subjective in character and can quite easily resolve 
the common charge of methodological inconsistency.  
Unfortunately, in Walzer’s attempt to establish a moral philosophy that is 
grounded in practice and not pure reasoning, his arguments suffer from occasional 
incoherence. His equivocation between deontology and consequentialism in 
discussing supreme emergency, and his substitution of sentimental reasoning for 
ordinary reasoning in his defense of the pied noir community during the Algerian 
War, are symptomatic of the difficulties of expounding a philosophy from the ground 
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up. His occasional incoherence, however, should not be taken as representative of a 
complete breakdown in his idea of justice. For his ideas have much in common with 
the social liberalism of Rawls (in contrast to the libertarianism of Nozick) and the 
contract theory of Rousseau (in contrast to Hobbes’s). I do not of course mean that 
Nozick’s and Hobbes’s ideas are inferior. Rather, I am saying that Walzer’s political 
thought must be studied alongside the ideas of these great scholars. There is much that 
one could learn from Walzer’s international ethics in Just and Unjust Wars and his 
political theory in Spheres of Justice. But by studying his magna opera as a collective 
discourse, I hope that it could facilitate further discussions among scholars concerning 
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